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What Ever Happened to
Canadian Environmental Law?
Stepan Wood, Georgia Tanner & Benjamin J. Richardson∗

This Article examines the history of Canadian environmental law to
explain why it has become a laggard in both legal reform and
environmental performance. Canadian environmental law has long been of
interest to scholars worldwide, yet its record is often poorly understood.
The Article contrasts recent developments with the seemingly progressive
initiatives of the 1970s, and analyzes these trends in light of their political,
economic, and governance context, as well as the wider critiques of
environmental law. It argues that there is considerable room for Canadian
governments to adopt more robust methods of environmental law,
including following pioneering reforms advanced in other countries.
However, even with such steps, further environmental degradation might
not be averted unless Canadians are prepared to accept more fundamental
changes to their economic systems and social values.
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INTRODUCTION
During the 1970s and 1980s, Canada was known internationally for
its leadership in environmental law reform and progressive stance on
environmental matters.1 Trail-blazing accomplishments such as the
Berger Inquiry into the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline, the Ontario
Environmental Assessment Board, “round tables” on environment and
economy, and comprehensive land claims agreements with Aboriginal
peoples impressed policy makers and scholars worldwide. Indeed,
Canada was known as an environmental law “exporter,” setting
precedents for other countries and taking a leadership role in
international environmental diplomacy. Reinforcing this reputation was
Canada’s image as a largely unspoiled wilderness, boasting 24 percent of
the world’s wetlands, 10 percent of its forests (including more than half of
its intact forest landscapes), 7 percent of its fresh water, its longest
coastline, and some of its most striking natural landscapes.2
But Canada’s reputation has waned in recent decades.3 It is now a
laggard in both policy innovation and environmental performance,
known for inaction and obstruction on such issues as climate change.
Scholarship on Canadian environmental law in international journals has

1. See Concern Expressed in Europe about Canada's Environmental Decline,
EARTHVISION ENVTL. NEWS, Feb. 15, 2001, available at http://www.hartfordhwp.com/archives/44/210.html.
2. See TREASURY BD. OF CAN., CANADA’S PERFORMANCE 2004, at 110 (2004); GLOBAL
FOREST WATCH, CANADA’S LARGE INTACT FOREST LANDSCAPES 2 (2006).
3. See CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND POLITICS: PROSPECTS FOR
LEADERSHIP AND INNOVATION (Deborah Vannijnatten & Robert Boardman eds., 3d ed. 2009);
DAVID R. BOYD, UNNATURAL LAW: RETHINKING CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY (2003); Laura Telford et al., Canada’s First Green Provincial Report Card, 27 CORP.
KNIGHTS 40 (2009).
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become much more critical.4 Environmental law courses in non-Canadian
universities now typically study Canada, if at all, only as an historical
example.5 Of the environmental law innovations that have occurred in
Canada in recent years, most borrow foreign precedents.
Some of the same trends are evident in other jurisdictions such as
Australia, where the political commitment to addressing climate change
and other environmental issues languished under the Howard
Government of 1996–2007.6 Likewise, in the United States the
environmental agenda faced indifference or hostility from Republican
administrations starting with Ronald Reagan in 1980 and culminating
with George W. Bush.7 By contrast, environmental law reform has
enjoyed a renaissance in the European Union over the past two decades.8
Even in innovative jurisdictions, a large gap is growing between
current environmental performance and ecological sustainability. The
countries with the best environmental records are not necessarily those
with the most sophisticated environmental laws; rather, they include
nations that have rejected industrial capitalism (Cuba, for example) or
pursued different development policies (such as Costa Rica).9 But
according to Professor William Rees, co-pioneer of “ecological footprint”
analysis, nearly every country is living beyond its means: “the world’s
average human eco-footprint is about 2.3 ha, even though there are only
1.9 ha of productive land and water per person on Earth.”10 In 2005, the
Board of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment warned that “human
activity is putting such strain on the natural functions of the Earth that
the ability of the planet’s ecosystems to sustain future generations can no
4. See, e.g., Simon Marsden, Why is Legislative EA Ineffective in Canada, and How Can It
Be Enhanced?, 18 INT’L IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 241 (1998); Loren Cass, A Climate of
Obstinacy: Symbolic Politics in Australian and Canadian Policy, 21 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L
AFF. 465 (2008); Duncan MacLellan, Shifting from the Traditional to the New Political Agenda:
The Changing Nature of Federal-Provincial Environmental Relations, 25 AM. REV. CAN. STUD.
323 (1995); Barry G. Rabe, Beyond Kyoto: Climate Change Policy in Multilevel Governance
Systems, 20 GOVERNANCE 423 (2007); Kathryn Harrison, The Road Not Taken: Climate Change
Policy in Canada and the United States, 7 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 92 (2007).
5. See, e.g., 2010 Course Handbook Listing Comparative Environmental Law,
MACQUARIE UNIVERSITY, http://www.handbook.mq.edu.au/2010/Units/PGUnit/LAW853 (last
updated Apr. 28, 2010); Course Listing: Comparative Environmental Law, NAT’L UNIV.
SINGAPORE (Oct. 19, 2010), http://law.nus.edu.sg/student_matters/course_listing/courses
_desc.asp?MC=LL4013&Sem=2.
6. See Peter Christoff, Policy Autism or Double-edged Dismissiveness? Australia's Climate
Policy under the Howard Government, 17 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 29 (2005).
7. See Patrick Parenteau, Anything Industry Wants: Environmental Policy under Bush II,
14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 363 (2004).
8. See generally MARIA LEE, EU ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CHALLENGES, CHANGE AND
DECISION-MAKING (2005).
9. See Daniel D. Moran et al., Measuring Sustainable Development—Nation by Nation, 64
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 470 (2008); Environmental Performance Index 2010, YALE UNIV.,
http://epi.yale.edu (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
10. William Rees, A Blot on the Land, 421 NATURE 898, 898 (2003).
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longer be taken for granted.”11 Innumerable other international studies
have echoed this view, including the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature’s annual Red List of Threatened Species,12 and
United Nations Environment Programme’s periodic Global Environment
Outlook reports.13
Something is badly wrong, and a deeper critique of environmental
law and policy is needed. The aim of this Article is to provide such a
critique of Canada’s situation. The Article does not offer blueprints for
change, although it will help readers to understand the roadblocks to
reform. Dwelling neither on fine details, nor abstruse theories, this
Article paints a mid-level picture of the decline of environmental law in
Canada.
It is difficult to evaluate the success or failure of environmental law
and to measure national environmental performance. This Article does
not rest its judgements on a systematic attempt to quantify Canada’s
environmental record, although relevant studies are cited to corroborate
the argument. It focuses instead on developments in Canada’s legal and
policy frameworks as a proxy for the shifting importance attached to
environmental reform. It canvasses selected developments at all levels of
government in Canada: federal, provincial, and municipal.
Part I analyzes the challenges facing environmental law in general,
focusing on three issues: political economy, instrument choice, and policy
frameworks. Part II turns to Canada, tracing the seemingly halcyon days
of the birth and growth of modern environmental law in Canada. Part III
examines its retreat and stagnation during the 1990s. Part IV explains the
decline of Canadian environmental law by reference to electoral politics,
perceived jurisdictional constraints arising from federalism, the
continuing dominance of primary industries, and the lasting impact of
neoliberal ideology. Part V considers the significance of some recent
innovations. The Conclusion offers some parting thoughts on the current
state of Canadian environmental law, and a glimpse into its potential
future. Although our purpose is primarily to explain problems rather than
to propose solutions, we hope to shed light on potential pathways for
environmental law reform in Canada.

11. MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, LIVING BEYOND OUR MEANS: NATURAL
ASSETS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING, STATEMENT FROM THE BOARD 5 (2005).
12. See News Release: Why is Biodiversity in Crisis?, IUCN RED LIST OF THREATENED
SPECIES (Sept. 3, 2010), http://www.iucnredlist.org/news/biodiversity-crisis (last visited Oct. 13,
2010) (reporting that “the escalating extinction crisis shows that the diversity of nature cannot
support the current pressure that humanity is placing on the planet”).
13. See, e.g., U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK GEO-4:
ENVIRONMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT 6 (2007); Global Environment Outlook, U.N. ENV’T
PROGRAMME, http://www.unep.org/geo (last visited Oct. 13, 2010).
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A DAMP SQUIB: THE LIMITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Before turning to Canada, we canvas some critiques of
environmental law in general. This will help us to evaluate whether
Canada’s mediocre record reflects unique factors or is a local
manifestation of broader trends.
In many respects, environmental law can be considered a damp
squib.14 Many environmental problems have worsened despite the vast
ensemble of regulations introduced in most countries in recent decades.
We continue to edge closer to the precipice of an anthropogenic collapse
in planetary ecological systems. Species are disappearing up to one
thousand times faster than they did in pre-human times.15 Atmospheric
carbon dioxide is at its highest level in some 650,000 years, and rising
rapidly.16 Coinciding with these trends is the soaring human population
and rampant economic growth; in the twentieth century the world’s
population quadrupled and the world economy grew by a factor of
thirteen.17
The mismatch between environmental law’s ubiquity and its relative
impotence requires analysis of underlying structural problems. Three
themes help to explain the failings of environmental law: its politicaleconomic context, its methods of regulation, and its policy framework.
A.

The Political Economy of Environmental Law

Read any newspaper or listen to radio and television, in Canada or
abroad, and you will soon notice remarks by politicians or corporate
executives claiming that our well-being depends on maintaining economic
growth.18 Despite its crushing burden on the biosphere, economic growth
remains the pre-eminent goal of virtually all nations worldwide. Canada
14. A “damp squib” is anything that fails to meet expectations.
15. See Juliet Jowit, Humans Driving Extinction Faster than Species Can Evolve, Say
Experts, GUARDIAN, Mar. 7, 2010, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/
2010/mar/07/extinction-species-evolve; see also EXTINCTION RATES 10–22 (John Lawton &
Robert May eds., 1995).
16. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESIS REPORT 37 (2007); Gary Gardner & Thomas Prugh, Seeding the Sustainable
Economy, in WORLD WATCH INST., STATE OF THE WORLD 2008, at 3 (2008).
17. See J.R. MCNEILL, SOMETHING NEW UNDER THE SUN: AN ENVIRONMENTAL
HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY WORLD 360 (2000).
18. See, e.g., G-20 Toronto Summit Declaration, para. 9, June 26–27, 2010, available at
http://canadainternational.gc.ca/g20/summit-sommet/2010/toronto-declarationtoronto.aspx?lang=eng (last visited Oct. 15, 2010) (“Increasing global growth . . . is the most
important step we can take in improving the lives of all of our citizens. . . .”); Hon. Iona
Campagnolo, Lieutenant Governor, British Columbia, Speech at the Opening of the Parliament
of British Columbia: Speech from the Throne (Feb. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.leg.bc.ca/37th3rd/4-8-37-3.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2010) (“Economic growth is the
bedrock for prosperity. . . . It is the vital base for stability and opportunity in every
community. . . .”).
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is no exception. In The Cancer Stage of Capitalism, Professor John
McMurtry analogizes this economic surge to a malignant tumour.19 As
many ecological economists have pointed out, infinite economic growth is
impossible in a finite world.20
The economic trends are truly staggering and have continued
seemingly unabated despite the expansion of environmental law during
this period, driven substantially by the consumer economy.21 Worldwide
consumer expenditure during the last century rose from US$1.5 trillion in
1900 to US$24 trillion in 1998.22 Likewise, international trade in goods
and services soared from US$50 billion in 1870 to US$8043 billion in
2005.23 Both trends have vastly outstripped the already extraordinary
growth in human numbers from some 1.6 billion in 1900 to 6 billion in
2000.
These trends are not simply an expression of some basic human urge
for greater material prosperity, but reflect the power of those with a
vested interest in continued growth and profit-making. This situation
restrains environmental law, as it does many forms of regulation, because
the political fortunes of states hinge on their success as economic
managers. In a socially heterogeneous and discordant world, where
disagreement over many values is rife, the capitalist state can hardly
govern on the basis of any putative moral consensus.24 Rather, driven by
the imperatives of national housekeeping, the state acts as parens patriae
with responsibility to sustain economic growth.25
Yet because economic activity can produce politically contentious
environmental impacts, the state must reconcile the antagonistic
imperatives of curbing the worst pollution while allowing market actors
enough freedom to create economic growth.26 Unresolved contradictions
between these imperatives have prompted major disputes over forestry,
nuclear power, and mining.27 With globalization and increasing trade
19. See generally JOHN MCMURTRY, THE CANCER STAGE OF CAPITALISM (1999).
20. See, e.g., HERMAN E. DALY & JOHN B. COBB, JR., FOR THE COMMON GOOD:
REDIRECTING THE ECONOMY TOWARD COMMUNITY, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND A
SUSTAINABLE FUTURE (1994); HERMAN E. DALY, ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS AND THE
ECOLOGY OF ECONOMICS: ESSAYS OF CRITICISM (1999); PETER A. VICTOR, MANAGING
WITHOUT GROWTH: SLOWER BY DESIGN, NOT DISASTER (2008).
21. See Mark Sagoff, Do We Consume Too Much?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1997, at 80.
22. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1998, at 1 (1998).
23. Expressed in constant 1990 dollar values. See WORLD TRADE ORG., WORLD TRADE
REPORT 2007, at 244 (2007); see also WILLIAM J. BERNSTEIN, A SPLENDID EXCHANGE: HOW
TRADE SHAPED THE WORLD (2008).
24. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 197–98 (T.A. Sinclair trans., 1981).
25. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 28–29, 38 (1957).
26. See K.J. Walker, The State in Environmental Management: The Ecological Dimension,
37 POL. STUD. 25, 26 (1989); Charles Lindblom, The Market as Prison, 44 J. POL. 324, 325–26
(1982).
27. E.g., ROBERT FALKNER, BUSINESS POWER AND CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (2009); IAN WATSON, FIGHTING OVER THE FORESTS (1990); David

2RICHARDSON-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

3/3/2011 10:14 AM

987

competition, corporations have gained unparalleled leverage over states,
and often prevail in such disputes. For example, the economic clout of the
oil and gas industry in Alberta gives it significant policy influence in the
province.28 Likewise, Ontario’s massive automotive industry has been
able to limit environmental regulation.29
Governments have sought to manage such contradictions and the
attendant challenges to their legitimacy by devolving authority to market
actors.30 Since the 1980s, they have privatized public services and assets
and liberalized market controls in the hope of reducing the regulatory
burden on industry and creating more opportunities to harness market
efficiencies.31 This strategy, however, carries its own risks, as illustrated
by the global financial crisis of 2008–09 where lack of regulation resulted
in short-term trading and speculation that became divorced from real
economic value.
The global financial crisis of 2008–09 led governments worldwide to
intervene to restore market stability in a way not seen since the Great
Depression.32 By contrast, the looming crisis of climate change prompted
only a lukewarm political accord in Copenhagen in 2009.33 The function
of environmental law, therefore, remains limited to mitigating the worst
effects of the dominant model of economic development rather than
fundamentally challenging or transforming it. It is rare for a major
project, especially one that promises many jobs and other economic
benefits, to be vetoed in the name of environmental protection. As will
be shown later, this perceived tension between environmental protection
and economic growth has been particularly salient in Canada because of
the continuing primacy of extractive industries in its economy.

Meyer, Protest Cycles and Political Process: American Peace Movements in the Nuclear Age, 46
POL. RES. Q. 451 (1993).
28. See Norah A. MacKendrick & Debra J. Davidson, State-Capital Relations in Voluntary
Environmental Improvement, 55 CURRENT SOCIOLOGY 674, 682–84 (2007).
29. See Julie Larsen & Steven Peck, Making Change, 27 ALTERNATIVES J. 17, 19–20
(2001).
30. See Robert W. Poole, Jr., Privatizing Essential Services, in MARKET LIBERALISM: A
PARADIGM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 205, 205 (David Boaz & Edward H. Crane eds., 1993).
31. The literature is massive. See, e.g., OLIVER LETWIN, PRIVATISING THE WORLD: A
STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL PRIVATISATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1988); BERNARDO
BORTOLOTTI & DOMENICO SINISCALCO, THE CHALLENGES OF PRIVATIZATION: AN
INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS (2004).
32. See Adding Up the Government’s Total Bailout Tab, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/02/04/business/20090205-bailout-totals-graphic.html;
Canada’s Economic Action Plan, GOV’T OF CAN., http://www.actionplan.gc.ca (last visited Oct.
14, 2010).
33. See Copenhagen Accord Climate Pledges Too Weak: UN, REUTERS, Mar. 31, 2010,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62U13M20100331.
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The Instruments of Environmental Law

The effectiveness of environmental law is blunted not only by its
political and economic context but also its methods of regulation. The rise
of modern environmental law in Western countries was closely associated
with the norms and institutions of the welfare state, including reliance on
instruments of public ownership and prescriptive standards.34 While these
techniques helped mitigate such acute pollution problems as water
pollution and lead in gasoline, their suitability for resolving complex
environmental issues has been disputed since the early 1980s.35 The main
elements of the critique are familiar: the conventional techniques of
“command and control” regulation are too rigid, complex, burdensome,
costly, inefficient, adversarial, and ineffective; they stifle entrepreneurial
innovation, eliminate jobs, and hinder competitiveness, in return for
diminishing environmental benefits; and they are prone to industry
capture.36 Their proliferation resulted in a dense maze of legal controls
whose effectiveness is increasingly outweighed by their administrative
costs and economic burden, so that ultimately the whole system threatens
to grind to a halt or collapse under its own weight.37 According to one
influential account, “[t]he present regulatory system wastes tens of
billions of dollars every year, misdirects resources, stifles innovation, and
spawns massive and often counterproductive litigation.”38
It is doubtful whether this grim picture of environmental regulation
ever corresponded faithfully to reality, particularly outside the United
States where it originated. It was certainly not an accurate depiction of
Canadian environmental law, which was and remains characterized by a
consultative style in which environmental rules were developed and
enforced in a largely non-coercive way via closed-door, bilateral
negotiations between government and industry.39 In addition, the volume
and stringency of Canada’s environmental regulations were dwarfed by
those of the United States. Canadian environmental legislation featured a

34. See Cass Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407 (1990);
Michael Moran, Understanding the Regulatory State, 32 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 391 (2002).
35. See, e.g., PETER C. YEAGER, THE LIMITS OF LAW: THE PUBLIC REGULATION OF
PRIVATE POLLUTION (1991).
36. See, e.g., Carolyn Abbott, Environmental Command Regulation, in ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY: A READER 61, 76–85 (Benjamin J. Richardson & Stepan Wood
eds., 2006).
37. See Gunther Teubner, Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions, in A
READER ON REGULATION 389, 398 (Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott & Christopher Hood eds.,
1998).
38. Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 1333, 1333 (1985).
39. See Michael Howlett, Policy Instruments and Implementation Styles: The Evolution of
Instrument Choice in Canadian Environmental Policy, in CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:
CONTEXT AND CASES 25, 25 (Debora VanNijnatten & Robert Boardman eds., 2002).
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high degree of administrative discretion, and standards were often
facility-specific rather than uniform. Regulators relied heavily on industry
self-monitoring and voluntarism.40 American-style adversarial legalism
was unheard of: prosecutions were rare, penalties were small, and citizeninitiated litigation almost unknown due to restrictive standing rules, the
risk of large adverse cost awards, the lack of statutory citizen suit
provisions, and judicial deference to governments.
Canadian business groups and conservative politicians nevertheless
embraced this narrative almost as vehemently as their American
counterparts, complaining of unnecessary, burdensome, and duplicative
environmental regulation while vowing to cut “red tape.”41 Outside
Canada, governments of various political stripes reacted to this narrative
by experimenting with a range of techniques to align regulation better
with market dynamics.42 Legal theorists have characterized such
responses in various ways, including “reflexive law,”43 “smart
“responsive
regulation,”45
and
“post-regulatory
regulation,”44
46
governance.” Canadian federal and provincial governments, however,
have had almost no appetite for such experimentation.47
These innovations in environmental law have tended to shift
responsibility for addressing environmental problems from the public
sector to the market or civil society. They have involved a preference for
legal arrangements that are “less heavy-handed, and more responsive to
the demands and possibilities of their context.”48 The instruments of
environmental governance have thus diversified to include more marketfriendly policy mechanisms, including economic incentives, contractual
agreements with industry, and even outright delegation of governmental

40. See BOYD, supra note 3, at 248–50.
41. See, e.g., Red Tape Reduction Act, S.O., c. 18 (1998) (Can.).
42. See, e.g., DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1992); U.S. WHITE
HOUSE,
REINVENTING
ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION
(1995),
available
at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/rsreport/251a.html; VOLUNTARY APPROACHES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Carlo Carraro and François Lévêque eds., 1999).
43. See GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 37–38 (1993).
44. See NEIL GUNNINGHAM & PETER GRABOSKY, SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1998).
45. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992).
46. See Colin Scott, Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post Regulatory
State, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY REFORMS FOR THE
AGE OF GOVERNANCE 145 (Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur eds., 2004).
47. See infra Part III.B.
48. Jenny Steele & Tim Jewell, Law in Environmental Decision-Making, in LAW IN
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING: NATIONAL, EUROPEAN, AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 1, 14 (Tim Jewell & Jenny Steele eds., 1998).
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responsibilities through industry-initiated codes of conduct.49 This trend
also occurred in international environmental law, as in the Kyoto
Protocol’s so-called “flexibility mechanisms.”50
Their success is debatable. Giving business too much discretion can
enable corporations to shirk responsibilities and leave costly
environmental problems unresolved.51 The recent implosion of global
financial markets and spate of corporate scandals show the social costs
that can arise when markets are off the leash.52 Furthermore, marketbased governance simply cannot function without detailed regulation;
tradable pollution allowances, such as the European Union’s Emissions
Trading Scheme of 2005,53 require extensive legal rules for their effective
operation.54
This oscillation between state- and market-based methods of
governance while environmental conditions continue to decline points to
an institutionally unsustainable path for environmental law. Historian
Joseph Tainter explains that societies tend to respond to their
problems—environmental, social, or economic—by investing in ever
more complex solutions.55 Confronted with mounting environmental
stresses we often prescribe more detailed rules, devise new technologies,
and commit greater financial resources. Initially, such investments can
yield concrete results; for example, in its early years between the late
1950s and mid-1970s, environmental law provided some immediate
tangible benefits, such as ridding cities of much of their smog.56 Later
experimentation with market-based methods of environmental law in an
49. See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 305–11 (1999); Alastair Iles,
Adaptive Management: Making Environmental Law and Policy More Dynamic, Experimentalist
and Learning, 13 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 288 (1996); ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS:
COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO REGULATORY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND
EUROPE (Eric W. Orts & Kurt Deketelaere eds., 2001).
50. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
arts. 4, 6, 12, 17, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (defining four mechanisms for flexibility in fulfilling
developed countries’ emission limitation and reduction commitments: joint implementation (art.
6), emissions trading (art. 17), the Clean Development Mechanism (art. 12), and “bubbles”
(art.4)).
51. See, e.g., Stepan Wood, Voluntary Environmental Codes and Sustainability, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 36, at 229.
52. See James Crotty, Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A Critical
Assessment of the “New Financial Architecture”, 33 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 563 (2009).
53. See EU CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: THE CHALLENGE OF NEW REGULATORY
INTIATIVES (Marjan Peeters & Kurt Deketelaere eds., 2006).
54. See Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 3 DUKE L.J. 607, 608 n.5 (1991);
Catherine Redgwell, Privatisation and Environmental Regulation: Some General Observations 15
J. ENERGY & NAT. RES. L. 33, 36 (1997).
55. See JOSEPH TAINTER, THE COLLAPSE OF COMPLEX SOCIETIES 37 (1988).
56. See, e.g., GARRET NAGLE, HAZARDS 117 (1998) (discussing English Clean Air Act,
1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, which helped to reduce the sources of the smog that had killed hundreds of
Londoners in the years immediately preceding its passage).
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attempt to reduce the complexity and costs of administrative regulation
has produced mixed results because many economic instruments such as
environmental taxes and tradable pollution allowances require an
extensive regulatory apparatus to be implemented effectively.57 Yet,
Professor Tainter argues, such investments in complexity yield ever more
meagre results to the point where the remedial costs become
unsustainable to society.58 This is because societies respond first with
measures that are the simplest and yield the biggest return, resorting only
later to more complex and expensive solutions. Over time, when the costs
of more complexity outweigh the benefits, the mounting pressure can
precipitate societal collapse. Historical evidence suggests that
environmental mismanagement proved ruinous to some older
civilizations.59
This is also the situation we face today: environmental law has
picked much of the low-hanging fruit, but faces a new generation of more
difficult challenges such as toxic chemicals in the food chain and global
warming. These will likely require much more complex responses. The
United Kingdom’s Stern Review of 2007 calculated that climate change if
left unabated will, by the middle of this century, cut world gross domestic
product (GDP) by between 5 and 20 percent annually, but by only 1
percent if we act now.60 Other commentators predict even higher costs of
inaction.61
Unless an entirely different economic and political system carrying a
lower ecological burden can be designed, environmental law will continue
to face ever-diminishing returns. Even when its instruments of
governance have been revamped in the search for more efficient ways to

57. See Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur, The Politics of Regulation in the Age of
Governance, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY REFORMS
FOR THE AGE OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 46, at 1 (noting that deregulation, privatization and
the use of market-based instruments have often, paradoxically, been accompanied by a
substantial increase in the volume and scope of regulation).
58. See TAINTER, supra note 55, at 92, 115, 122.
59. Environmental mismanagement, as manifested for example by poorly designed laws,
should also ultimately be viewed as a result of political, economic, and cultural factors, which
Professor Jared Diamond examines in a series of case studies including Easter Island, the Maya
people, and Haiti. See generally JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO
FAIL OR SUCCEED (2005).
60. See NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE vi
(2007), available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/
d/Summary_of_Conclusions.pdf.
61. See GEORGE MONBIOT, HEAT: HOW TO STOP THE PLANET BURNING 6–9 (2005)
(discussing ecological and economic costs of climate change); TIMOTHY FLANNERY, THE
WEATHER MAKERS 233–38 (2006) (discussing costs and benefits of climate change mitigation);
THOMAS HOMER-DIXON, THE UPSIDE OF DOWN: CATASTROPHE AND RENEWAL AND THE
RENEWAL OF CIVILISATION 77–100, 219–23 (2006) (discussing rising costs and diminishing
returns from our economic model in light of declining fossil fuel reserves and the absence of easy
alternatives).
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solve environmental damage, it leaves unchanged the very system that
generates such damage. This brings us to the third important aspect of
modern environmental law: its policy frameworks to integrate economic
and environmental concerns in support of sustainable development.
C.

Sustainability: The Policy Context of Environmental Law

Since the late 1980s, “sustainability”—or “sustainable development”
in its most common formulation—has emerged as the most influential
norm in environmental policy making worldwide. It is formally
recognized in countless international environmental treaties, national
environmental plans, and legislation.62 It aims to reconcile the habits of
unfettered economic exploitation of the biosphere with the reality that all
life, including humankind, depends on healthy ecosystems. Several
principles under this rubric have been enunciated by policy makers,
notably the precautionary principle and inter-generational equity.63 The
sustainability discourse has inspired a move toward more principled and
strategic approaches to environmental policy in Canada and other
Western states, in contrast to the previous more fragmented and tentative
approaches.
The ambiguity and open-endedness of the concept of sustainability
allow it to be embraced by numerous actors with divergent objectives.64
Its broader potential implications, including a radical restructuring of
capitalism65 and an emphasis on biosphere ethics in environmental
policy,66 have mostly been marginalized by business and political elites
which have promoted the notion that the creative and innovative side of

62. See MARIE-CLAIRE CORDONIER SEGGER & ASHFAQ KHALFAN, SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT LAW: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, AND PROSPECTS (2004); Stepan Wood,
Sustainability in International Law, in UNESCO ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS
(2003), http://www.eolss.net; RICHARD L. REVESZ, PHILIPPE SANDS & RICHARD B. STEWART,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: THE UNITED
STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (2000); John
Dembach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance, 49 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1 (1998).
63. See, e.g., Jaye Ellis & Stepan Wood, International Environmental Law, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY 343, 361–64, 373, 376–78 (Benjamin J. Richardson
& Stepan Wood eds., 2006).
64. See Andrew Basiago, Methods of Defining ‘Sustainability’, 3 SUSTAINABLE DEV. 109,
111–19 (1995).
65. See HERMAN E. DALY, STEADY STATE ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1991); Mick Common &
Charles Perrings, Towards an Ecological Economics of Sustainability, 6 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 7
(1992).
66. See KLAUS BOSSELMANN, THE PRINCIPLE OF SUSTAINABILITY: TRANSFORMING LAW
AND GOVERNANCE (2008).
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capitalism can find solutions to protect the environment while growing
the economy.67
Known as “ecological modernization,” this branch of the
sustainability discourse reframes the ethical and political dilemmas of
industrialization as technical and managerial challenges.68 It has been
particularly influential in Japan and the European Union, but less evident
in Canada.69 Ecological modernization posits that environmental
degradation can be resolved through a framework of industrial
modernity, harnessing innovative technologies, business acumen, and
managerial creativity.70 Consequently, green companies should benefit
financially by gaining competitive advantages, building new markets, and
improving production efficiency.71 This “business case” for sustainability
has become a very influential driver of corporate social responsibility,
increasingly displacing an earlier emphasis on ethically-motivated
change.72
Thus, while the sustainability discourse initially promised a new
approach to development that assimilated ecological principles, its legacy
has been muted, incremental, and reformist. Markets continue to enjoy
significant autonomy as trusted agents of progress, while states have
embellished their environmental laws with the rhetoric of sustainable
development that leave largely undisturbed many routine controls and
procedures.
As will be shown in the following Parts of this Article, all of the
issues canvassed above help explain the rise and decline of environmental
law in Canada. The extraordinary growth in its environmental laws in the
1970s marked a period of exuberant confidence in the ability of states to
solve environmental problems through enlightened regulation. Later,
Canada’s increasingly mangled environmental regulations reflected the
effects of neoliberal deregulation, fiscal restraint, and corporate

67. On the potential symbiosis of environmental and economic concerns, see Michael E.
Porter & Claas van der Linde, Green and Competitive: Ending the Stalemate, 73 HARV. BUS.
REV. 120 (1995).
68. See Mikael Skou Andersen & Ilmo Massa, Ecological Modernisation—Origins,
Dilemmas and Future Directions, 2 J. ENVTL. POL’Y & PLAN. 337 (2000); MAARTEN A. HAJER,
THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE: ECOLOGICAL MODERNISATION AND THE
POLICY PROCESS 3 (1995).
69. See Hajime Nishimura, The Greening of Japanese Industry, in BUSINESS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 21 (Michael D. Rogers ed., 1995); GOVERNING THE ENVIRONMENT: POLITICS,
POLICY AND ORGANIZATION IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES (Peter Christensen ed., 1996).
70. See generally JOSEPH HUBER, NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL
INNOVATION (2004).
71. E.g., WORLD BUSINESS COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. & U.N. ENV’T
PROGRAMME, CLEANER PRODUCTION AND ECO-EFFICIENCY, COMPLEMENTARY
APPROACHES TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 3 (1998).
72. See John Elkington, Towards the Sustainable Corporation: Win-Win-Win Business
Strategies for Sustainable Development, 36 CAL. MGMT. REV. 90, 91 (1994).
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influence. The sustainability discourse has also been influential in
Canadian law-making, though it too has not resolved the contradictions
in environmental governance nor reversed Canada’s environmental
decline.
II. THE HALCYON DAYS OF CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A.

Building an Environmental Law System

There was a time when there was a much greater public faith in the
transformative capacity of politics to solve environmental problems. The
late 1960s and early 1970s were heady days for environmental law
advocacy in Canada and some other countries.73 Through legislative
reform, lobbying, and other strategies, environmentalists believed that
they could use the organs of the state as a means to solve the mounting
pollution, resource depletion, and other environmental problems of
industrial capitalism.74 Legislation had, of course, been availed earlier to
manage the environment, but primarily as a regulatory tool to facilitate
the “orderly” exploitation of natural resources.75 The common law had
also played a role, but it was limited by its constricted focus on
safeguarding private property rights.76 The emergence of a system of
environmental law began only in the late 1960s, when a more liberal
political climate in Western societies, coupled with greater economic
prosperity and improved scientific understanding of humanity’s
ecological impacts, created the conditions for heightened public
awareness and demand for action on environmental deterioration.77 In
many parts of the world, especially among developing countries, these
trends transpired much later.
Many of the basic features of environmental law that we know today
are traceable to innovations in this period. Milestones such as
environmental impact assessment legislation,78 endangered species
protection laws,79 and specialist environmental agencies and courts80 were
73. See William Rodgers, The Most Creative Moments in the History of Environmental
Law: “The Whats”, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1.
74. See generally JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR
CITIZEN ACTION (1971). For a Canadian perspective, see D. Paul Emond, Are We There Yet?
Reflections on the Success of the Environmental Law Movement in Ontario, 46 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 219, 219–25 (2008).
75. ROBYN ECKERSLEY, ENVIRONMENTALISM AND POLITICAL THEORY: TOWARD AN
ECOCENTRIC APPROACH 35–36 (1992).
76. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE COMMON LAW (John Lowry &
Rod Edmunds eds., 2000).
77. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the Beginning, A Fundamental Shift of Paradigms: A Theory
and Short History of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 981 (1994).
78. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (1969).
79. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (1973).
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among the flurry of reforms in an era where many were optimistic about
the ability of the state to solve environmental challenges. Some of these
reforms were initiated, or evolved to an advanced form, in Canada. Their
progenitors were planted in the late 1940s. In Ontario, the development
of a more coherent framework for land use and watershed planning was
stimulated by the Conservation Authorities Act of 194681 and the
Planning Act of 1946.82 Pollution began to be addressed more
systematically in the 1950s, particularly through the creation of
specialized agencies. A leading example was the creation in 1956 of the
Ontario Water Resources Commission with the mandate to reduce
industrial pollution, along with the oversight of sewage disposal and
drinking water treatment.83
Pollution of the Great Lakes also fostered a growing national and
international dimension to environmental controls in Canada; in 1964, the
Canadian and U.S. governments asked the International Joint
Commission to study pollution and water levels in the Great Lakes.84 Its
recommendations led to the 1972 bilateral Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement,85 which was superseded by a new agreement in 197886 and
extended by supplementary protocols in 1983 and 1987.87 The 1972
Agreement was one of the earliest international agreements to adopt an
ecosystem approach, setting an ambitious and still unrealized goal of zero
discharge of persistent toxic substances into the Great Lakes Basin
ecosystem.88 Canada and the United States would continue to cooperate
on other environmental issues, such as negotiating the 1991 Canada-U.S.
Air Quality Agreement to control acid rain pollution.89

80. See, e.g., Land and Environment Court Act, 1979, N.S.W. Stat. 204 (Austl.)
(establishing environmental agencies and courts in New South Wales, Australia).
81. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.27.
82. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13.
83. See DOUGLAS MACDONALD, BUSINESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN CANADA
70 (2007).
84. See Don Piper, A Significant Docket for the International Joint Commission, 59 AM. J.
INT’L L. 593, 593 (1965). The International Joint Commission was established by the Boundary
Waters Treaty, U.S.-U.K., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448, to help prevent and resolve disputes
between Canada and the United States over the use of boundary waters and other
transboundary issues. See ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2008: BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY
CENTENNIAL EDITION 2 (2009).
85. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, U.S.-Can., Apr. 15, 1972, 23.1 U.S.T. 301.
86. Agreement between Canada and the United States of America on Great Lakes Water
Quality, 1978, U.S.-Can., Nov. 22, 1978, 30 U.S.T. 1383.
87. Protocol Amending the 1978 Agreement between the United States of America and
Canada on Great Lakes Water Quality, as Amended on October 16, 1983, U.S.-Can., Nov. 18,
1987, T.I.A.S. No. 11551; Agreement Amending the Agreement of November 22, 1978 and
Supplementing Annex 3, U.S.-Can., Oct. 16, 1983, T.I.A.S. 10798.
88. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 85, art. II & Annex 12, art. 2.
89. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Canada on Air Quality, Mar. 13, 1991, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S. No. 11783.
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Pollution was certainly not the only concern. Although Canada had
set aside natural areas for recreation since the 1885 creation of Banff
National Park, it was not until much later that national parks began to be
conceived as “wilderness” areas to be protected for posterity. Only by the
mid-1960s had sufficient pressure emerged to expand the parks system
with the aim of protecting all representative ecosystems. Amid plans for
intensification of development in Jasper and Banff, the National and
Provincial Parks Association was founded with the goal of redirecting
park management away from economic to conservation goals.90 The
provinces were also expanding their nature conservation laws during this
period, and in 1971 Ontario passed Canada’s first endangered species
protection law,91 modelled after the U.S. Endangered Species Act.92
A defining moment in the move towards an actual system of
environmental protection was Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s 1969
Throne Speech promoting five new environmental statutes, most of which
would later be merged into the Canadian Environmental Protection Act
of 1988.93 The Canada Water Act was adopted shortly afterwards in 1970,
introducing pollution control regulations that arose partly in response to
pressure from community groups such as Pollution Probe.94 In 1971, the
Trudeau government created a special department, known today as
Environment Canada, and passed the Clean Air Act.95 The federal
Fisheries Act was also transformed into a powerful anti-pollution statute
in this period by amending it to protect fish habitat and prevent water
pollution.96 Several provinces also showed leadership: Ontario enacted its
Environmental Protection Act and created a ministry of the environment,
while Alberta created a department of the environment and enacted the

90. See Alan MacEachern, Changing Ecologies: Preservation in Four National Parks, 19351965, in CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY: ESSENTIAL READINGS 361, 379 (David
Freeland Duke ed. 2006).
91. Endangered Species Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.15, repealed by Endangered Species Act of
2007, S.O. 2007, c. 6.
92. Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 275, 16 U.S.C. § 668aa(c),
repealed by Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006).
93. R.S.C. 1985, c. 16 (supp. 4) (in force June 30, 1988) (incorporating the Clean Air Act,
Environmental Contaminants Act and Ocean Dumping Act, among others), repealed by
Canadian Environmental Protection Act of 1999, S.C. 1999, c. 33; see MACDONALD, supra note
83, at 71.
94. Canada Water Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-11; see Who We Are: Highlights of Past
Accomplishments, POLLUTION PROBE, http://www.pollutionprobe.org/Whoweare/Milestones
2.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2010).
95. See MACDONALD, supra note 83, at 71; Clean Air Act, S.C.1970-71-72, c. 47, repealed
by Canadian Environmental Protection Act of 1988, R.S.C. 1985, c. 16 (supp. 4).
96. An Act to Amend the Fisheries Act and to Amend the Criminal Code in Consequence
Thereof, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14.
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Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act.97 In 1973, the federal government
introduced the Environmental Assessment Review Process, the first of
many assessment rules,98 which was soon followed by provincial initiatives
such as Ontario’s Environmental Assessment Act of 1975.99
Concomitantly to these initiatives, networks of environmental
lawyers emerged that would later play crucial roles as advocates,
watchdogs, and commentators of Canadian developments. The Canadian
Environmental Law Association and the Canadian Environmental Law
and Research Foundation were both founded in 1970.100 Similar groups
sprang up in Alberta and British Columbia. The development of this
niche environmental lawyer community was crucial in providing focused
pressure for adoption of specific reforms and improved
implementation.101
This period was not without setbacks and delays. Lengthy waits in
implementing new environmental statutes occurred in some instances;102
Ontario’s new controls on pollution spills,103 enacted in the late 1970s,
were not proclaimed in force until 1985, following a change of
government. Fiscal constraints also limited the expansion of
environmental agencies, and Environment Canada incurred budget
cuts.104 And, foreshadowing later major constraints to federal leadership,
the Trudeau Government prevaricated at times in the face of provincial
or industry resistance to economically costly environmental regulation.105
While many of these trends were not unique to Canada, some were.
A shift in Canadian law was underway during this period relating to
recognition of Aboriginal rights, with wider environmental
ramifications.106 The trigger was the Supreme Court of Canada’s

97. Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19; Clean Air Act, S.A. 1971, c. 16
(Alta.); Clean Water Act, S.A. 1971, c. 17 (Alta.); see HENRY C. KLASSEN, A BUSINESS
HISTORY OF ALBERTA 308 (1999) (discussing the Alberta legislation).
98. See ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN PRACTICE: INSTRUMENTS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 189 (Bhaskar Nath et al. eds., 2002).
99. Environmental Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.18; see MACDONALD, supra note 83,
at 71.
100. See About CIELAP: History, CANADIAN INST. FOR ENVTL. LAW AND POLICY,
http://www.cielap.org/history.php (last visited Sept. 4, 2010).
101. Emond, supra note 74, at 222.
102. See THOMAS RIDEOUT, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, REGULATORY REGIMES AND
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: A REALITY CHECK 12 (1997).
103. See Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19, pt. X.
104. See Glen Toner, Contesting the Green: Canadian Environmental Policy at the Turn of
the Century, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND POLITICS IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 71, 76
(Uday Desai ed., 2002).
105. Id. at 76–77.
106. While Indigenous minorities in Australia, New Zealand, and the United States were
also gaining better recognition of their rights during the 1970s, the trend was much more
pronounced in Canadian law. Paul L.A.H. Chartrand, The “Race” for Recognition: Toward a
Policy of Recognition of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada, in ABORIGINAL TITLE AND
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landmark judgement in the Calder case of 1973, which recognized
Aboriginal title to land.107 To stem the resulting legal claims and the
attendant disputes over hydropower, forestry, and other developments on
Indigenous lands,108 Canada drafted the Comprehensive Land Claims
Policy,109 which provided a much more sophisticated model than the
flawed settlement negotiated by the U.S. government with Alaska
Natives in the early 1970s. It not only gave a framework to negotiate
Indigenous claims, but fashioned new regimes for regional environmental
governance.110 Eventually covering vast tracts of northern Canada, the
policy provided a world class model for participatory, bi-cultural
environmental governance. The Policy was innovative in several respects;
it led to negotiated agreements that established complex wildlife and
natural resource management institutions which incorporated Aboriginal
values and knowledge, involved local Aboriginal people in decision
making, as well, allowed agreements to be later renegotiated if necessary
to allow Aboriginal parties to secure additional benefits and rights as
circumstances changed.111
Another Canadian innovation also relating to Aboriginal peoples
was the use of public inquiries as a means of community participation and
dialogue. In 1974 the federal government established the Berger Inquiry
to review plans to build an oil and gas pipeline through the Mackenzie
Valley, in western Canada.112 Headed by Justice Thomas Berger, whose
commission gave him considerable flexibility, the inquiry pioneered
innovative techniques to ensure that all stakeholders, especially
indigenous communities, would have a say. For example, Berger
established a fund to support any group that desired to participate in the
inquiry but lacked the financial means to do so. Berger also held hearings
in the affected communities, and improvised informal procedures to
improve the inquiry’s accessibility.113
The Berger report endorsed several themes that remain central to
environmental law, including the idea of ecological limits to economic
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND 125 (Louis A. Knafla &
Haijo Westra eds., 2010); Kent McNeil, The Sources and Content of Indigenous Land Rights in
Australia and Canada: A Critical Comparison, in ABORIGINAL TITLE AND INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES: CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND, supra, at 146.
107. Calder v. British Columbia (Att’y Gen.), [1973] S.C.R. 313.
108. One prominent example was the James Bay Dam, in Quebec. See SEAN
MCCUTCHEON, ELECTRIC RIVERS: THE STORY OF THE JAMES BAY PROJECT (1991).
109. See DEP’T OF INDIAN AFFAIRS AND N. DEV., STATEMENT ON CLAIMS OF INDIAN AND
INUIT PEOPLE (1973).
110. See BENJAMIN J. RICHARDSON, DONNA CRAIG & BEN BOER, REGIONAL
AGREEMENTS FOR INDIGENOUS LANDS AND CULTURES IN CANADA 3–4 (1995).
111. Id. at 56–58 (discussing the example of the Inuvialuit Agreement).
112. See THOMAS BERGER, NORTHERN FRONTIER, NORTHERN HOMELAND: THE REPORT
OF THE MACKENZIE VALLEY PIPELINE INQUIRY (1985).
113. Id.
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growth, the realization that some places may need total protection against
development, the need to consider cumulative impacts, the need for
caution in the face of uncertainty, and the importance of informed
consent of affected aboriginal peoples.114 The report’s recommended
moratorium on the pipeline stayed in place for two decades, until the
proposal was resurrected with widespread support from affected First
Nations. Berger’s approach today remains a benchmark for the public
inquiry model, setting a precedent that countries such as Australia and
New Zealand have followed in areas of Indigenous affairs and
environmental policy.
Aside from these developments related to Aboriginal rights and
public inquiries, however, Canada did little to earn its reputation as an
environmental law innovator during this early period. On the contrary,
Canada was and still is much more of an importer than an exporter of
environmental law reform. As in many other fields, American law and
policy were the main influences on Canadian environmental law. From
environmental impact assessment to endangered species protection,
environmental rights, and environmental clean-up liability, Canadian law
and policy emulated American precedents, often in watered-down forms
and often after delays measured in decades.115
As Professor David Boyd points out, this pattern of policy emulation
is a double-edged sword, benefiting environmental protection in areas
where American standards are higher but holding back progress where
the United States is a laggard.116 Ironically, Canada continues to emulate
American environmental law even as evidence of its failure to solve
environmental problems mounts. The fundamental problem with the
American and Canadian approaches is that they address symptoms rather
than root causes of environmental degradation.117 Thus, despite the
development of numerous environmental laws in the halcyon days of
Canadian environmental law, Canada’s reputation as an early
environmental law pioneer does not stand up to careful scrutiny.
B.

Second Generation Reforms

Although the intensity of environmental law reform in Canada has
never matched the first wave of activity in the 1970s, some spurts of
reform continued to build upon earlier initiatives and to address new
114. Id.
115. See BOYD, supra note 3, at 225; see also supra Part I.B. Among these influential
American statutes, see, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–
4370f (2006); Endangered Species Act, 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675
(2006).
116. See BOYD, supra note 3, at 225.
117. Id. at 276.
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challenges. Through the 1980s, the environmental movement in Canada,
as elsewhere, became a significant political force.118 Its salience peaked in
the late 1980s in the lead-up to the historic Earth Summit of 1992.119 But
this period also displayed some emerging stresses in Canadian
environmental law, including federal-provincial tensions and the
economic cost of reforms, which eventually would result in major policy
shifts and retreats.
Federal leadership was evident in some areas. Canada strengthened
standards for environmental assessment of proposed developments. In
1984, the federal government promulgated a rule requiring
environmental assessments of all projects involving federal lands,
approvals, or funding.120 Another significant federal milestone was the
1988 amendments of the Canada National Parks Act, mandating
maintenance of “ecological integrity” in park management.121 These
reforms spawned a massive expansion of Canada’s protected areas, in
which some 38 million ha were added, raising the area under protection
from 2.95 percent of Canada’s landmass in 1989 to 6.84 percent in 2000.122
The 1980s also saw a new emphasis on robust and independent
enforcement of environmental laws. Ontario led the way, establishing a
separate inspections and enforcement branch within its environment
ministry.123 Inspections increased in frequency and significant fines and
penalties began to be handed out to the worst polluters. A groundbreaking 1980 Yukon court decision recognized that “pollution offences
must be approached as crimes, not as morally blameless technical
118. See Robert Paehlke, The Environmental Movement in Canada, in CANADIAN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND POLITICS: PROSPECTS FOR LEADERSHIP AND INNOVATION,
supra note 3, ch. 1.
119. Also known as the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development.
According to national polls, the number of Canadians who perceived harm to the environment
to be a “very serious” issue declined from an all-time high of 77 percent in 1990 to 63 percent by
April 1992. See KATHRYN HARRISON, PASSING THE BUCK: FEDERALISM AND CANADIAN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 117 (1996).
120. Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order, SOR/1984-467.
Federal officials did not take the Order was not taken seriously, however, until the courts
declared it legally binding in 1989. See Canadian Wildlife Fed’n Inc. v. Canada (Minister of the
Env’t), [1989] 3 F.C. 309 (Trial Div.), aff’d, (1989), 99 N.R. 72 (C.A.).
121. An Act to Amend the National Parks Act and to Amend An Act to Amend the
National Parks Act, S.C. 1988, c. 48, s. 4 (adding s. 5(1.2) (“Maintenance of ecological integrity
through the protection of natural resources shall be the first priority when considering park
zoning and visitor use in a management plan.”)), repealed by Canada National Parks Act, S.C.
2000, c. 32 (enacting a broader ecological integrity clause, s. 8(2) (“Maintenance or restoration of
ecological integrity, through the protection of natural resources and natural processes, shall be
the first priority of the Minister when considering all aspects of the management of parks.”)).
122. See Philip Dearden & Jessica Dempsey, Protected Areas in Canada: Decade of Change,
48 CANADIAN GEOGRAPHER 225, 226 (2004).
123. See Front-line Environmental Officers Protecting Our Environment, ONT. MINISTRY OF
THE ENV’T, http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/en/enviroforce/protection/officers.php (last visited Sept. 4,
2010).

2RICHARDSON-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

3/3/2011 10:14 AM

1001

breaches of a regulatory standard,”124 reflecting a change in the way
environmental violations were perceived in Canadian society.
Although environmental rights were not included in the new Charter
of Rights and Freedoms in 1982,125 the constitutional entrenchment of
human rights intensified demands for increased public participation and
access to information in environmental decision making. However, it was
not until the early 1990s—some twenty years after similar laws were
passed in the United States—that Canadian jurisdictions began to enact
environmental bills of rights to create more systematic frameworks for
public participation, access to information, and access to justice on
environmental matters.126 The Northwest Territories were the first to do
so, in 1990,127 followed by the Yukon128 and Ontario.129 The federal
Canadian Environmental Protection Act of 1999 also introduced public
notice, comment, and citizen suit provisions.130 Public access to
information was strengthened by a National Pollutant Release Inventory
in 1992, modelled after the U.S. Toxics Release Inventory.131 The early
1990s also saw the enactment of federal limits on the release of dioxins
from pulp and paper mills, one of the most successful environmental
regulations in Canadian history.132
Tempering these successes were several other prominent regulatory
directions that emerged in Canadian environmental policy in the 1990s, as
governmental agencies faced tightening budgets and pressure to
streamline or downsize operations. Under the influence of the “New
Public Management” philosophy, Canadian governments initiated public
sector reforms that hit environmental departments particularly hard.133

124. R. v. United Keno Hill Mines, [1980] 1 Y.R. 299, para.10 (Can. Yukon Terr. Ct.).
125. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11
(U.K.).
126. See Elaine L. Hughes & David Iyalomhe, Substantive Environmental Rights in Canada,
30 OTTAWA L. REV. 229, 234 (1998–99).
127. See Environmental Rights Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c.83 (supp.).
128. See Environment Act, S.Y. 1991, c. 5.
129. See Environmental Bill of Rights, S.O. 1993, c. 28.
130. S.C. 1999, c. 33, pt. 2.
131. See Canadian Environmental Protection Act of 1999, S.C. 1999, c. 33, s. 48 (establishing
the inventory); National Pollutant Release Inventory, ENV’T CAN., http://www.ec.gc.ca/inrpnpri/default.asp?lang=En&n=4A577BB9-1 (last visited Sept. 4, 2010).
132. See Pulp and Paper Mill Effluent Chlorinated Dioxins and Furans Regulations,
SOR/1992-267; Jerry V. DeMarco & Toby Vigod, Smarter Regulation: The Case for
Enforcement and Transparency, 17 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 85, 95 (2007) (reporting on the
regulations’ effectiveness); Implementing Sustainable Practices in the Pulp and Paper Industry: A
10-Year Path to Success, ENV’T CAN. (June 6, 2003), http://www.ec.gc.ca/media_archive/
press/2003/030606_b_e.htm; C.E. Luthe, Progress in Reducing Dioxins and AOX: A Canadian
Perspective, 36 CHEMOSPHERE 225 (1998) (reporting 99 percent reduction in discharges of
dioxins from Canadian pulp mills).
133. See PETER AUCOIN, THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: CANADA IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 8–16, 198–202 (1996).
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“New Public Management” was a label used to describe a program for
public sector reform based on the application of private sector
management philosophies and techniques to the public sector.134 Key
features of these reforms included massive budget and program cuts, use
of private sector management techniques, a “client-service” orientation
to regulated industries, cost-benefit analysis of proposed regulations, and
increased reliance on non-legislative tools and private-sector standards.135
These changes were accompanied by a reduced federal role in
environmental regulation, harmonization of allegedly duplicative
provincial and federal regulation, and an increased role for the provinces
in the negotiation and implementation of international agreements and
the setting of Canadian international environmental priorities.136
Alongside these cutbacks, the same period saw efforts to improve
integration of environmental and economic policy making, particularly in
the upper echelons of government. Measures to facilitate such integration
included environmental analysis of policy proposals and legislation across
different government portfolios, establishment of national and provincial
“round tables” on environment and economy, preparation of sustainable
development plans for natural resource sectors, creation of a federal
Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, and
concomitant requirements of federal departments to prepare sustainable
development strategies.137 These reforms were paralleled in provincial
governments, such as the establishment in 1993 of an Environmental
Commissioner of Ontario.138 While seemingly impressive, these efforts
towards a “whole-of-government” approach to furthering sustainability
tended to be much less effective in practice.
Most notable among the disappointing results was the Progressive
Conservative federal government’s much vaunted 1990 Green Plan—one
of the earliest national sustainable development plans.139 The Green Plan
promised C$3 billion of federal spending on environmental protection
over five years, but with a decline in public attention to environmental
issues after the Earth Summit and the election of a deficit-slaying Liberal
government in 1993, the Green Plan lost political support and 70 percent

134. See JAN-ERIK LANE, NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT (2000); KATE MCLAUGHLIN, NEW
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS (2002).
135. Id.
136. On these themes, see generally Howlett, supra note 39; Kathryn Harrison, FederalProvincial Relations and the Environment: Unilateralism, Collaboration, and Rationalization, in
CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: CONTEXT AND CASES, supra note 39, at 123.
137. See BOYD, supra note 3, at 214, 297.
138. Environmental Bill of Rights, S.O. 1993, c. 28, s. 49; see generally ENVTL. COMM’R OF
ONT. (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.eco.on.ca.
139. See ENV’T CAN., CANADA’S GREEN PLAN FOR A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT (1990).
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of this money was never allocated.140 Notwithstanding this lack of
funding, the Green Plan itself was a disappointment, having more to do
with spending than with creating lasting institutional change.141
More successful were the institutional mechanisms established to
foster federal-provincial cooperation, research, and dialogue on national
environmental challenges. The Canadian Council of Resource and
Environment Ministers, comprised of federal and provincial cabinet
ministers, established the National Task Force on Environment and
Economy in 1986 “to initiate dialogue on environment-economy
integration among” Canadian governmental, business, and community
stakeholders and to help reconcile conflicts concerning natural resource
industries.142 Illustrative of Canada’s lingering capacity to inspire
environmental law reform, the example set by the task force influenced
other countries, such as Australia, which in 1989 established the Resource
Assessment Commission with a similar mandate.143
International law provided another impetus for domestic action
during this period, and was arguably a seminal factor in postponing
Canada’s policy stagnation. While a distinct corpus of international law
relating to the environment emerged in the early 1970s, it was not until
the late 1980s that a more comprehensive global framework for
cooperation on environmental matters emerged. Initiatives such as the
World Commission on Environment and Development, established in
1983, and the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) were instrumental to this shift. Many
international environmental conventions ratified by Canada would
ultimately lead to changes in domestic legislation, but the process was
painfully slow: it was, for example, thirty years after the signing of the
CITES convention144 and more than ten years after the Convention on
Biological Diversity145 before Canada enacted comprehensive federal

140. See BOYD, supra note 3, at 104 (noting, however, that this failure was due to recession,
not decline in public attention); see also Robert Gale, Canada’s Green Plan, in NATIONALE
UMWELTPLÄNE IN AUSGEWÄHLTEN INDUSTRIELÄNDERN 97 (1997) (criticizing Canada’s Green
Plan, supra note 139).
141. RICHARD TARASOFSKY, CANADA’S PROGRESS IN ADDRESSING THE STRATEGIC
IMPERITIVE SET OUT IN “OUR COMMON FUTURE” 4–5 (2007), available at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/facing_canada_progress.pdf.
142. See NAT’L TASK FORCE ON ENV’T AND ECON., PROGRESS REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
TASK FORCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMY 1 (1988).
143. Resource Assessment Commission Act, 1989 (Cth), No. 94, s 5. However, the
Commission was dissolved in 1992 as a cost-cutting measure. See Benjamin J. Richardson & Ben
Boer, Contribution of Public Inquiries to Environmental Assessment, 2 AUSTRALASIAN J.
ENVTL. MGMT. 90, 92 (1995).
144. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna,
March 3, 1973, 27.2 U.S.T. 1087, 1976 U.N.T.S. 244.
145. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, S. EXEC. DOC. 103-30, 31 I.L.M. 818.
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endangered species legislation.146 Parallel to such legislative steps,
principles of international environmental law also began to inform
Canadian court decisions.147
Canada owes its international reputation for leadership in
environmental policy in large part to its role in global environmental
negotiations, rather than to its actual accomplishments in domestic
environmental regulation.148 Canadian diplomat Maurice Strong chaired
both the 1972 Stockholm and 1992 UNCED conferences, receiving praise
for his diplomatic skills.149 Canada played an important role in numerous
international environmental negotiations, including the 1987 Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer150 and the 2001
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants.151 In 1993,
former federal Assistant Deputy Minister of the Environment Elizabeth
Dowdeswell was appointed the Executive Director of United Nations
Environment Programme.152 Another prominent Canadian on the world
stage was Jim MacNeill, a former environmental advisor to Prime
Minister Trudeau. MacNeill was General Secretary of World Commission
on Environment and Development and coauthored its famous final
report.153 In the non-governmental sector, Canadian Paul Watson cofounded Greenpeace in Vancouver in 1971 and later established the Sea
Shepherd Conservation Society.154 Together, these and other Canadians
have played a seminal role in representing Canada as a “green” nation on
the world stage.155
Parallel to these international dimensions has been another seminal
movement, concerning private sector involvement in environmental
governance.156 This trend is a product of a constellation of pressures,

146. Species at Risk Act, S.C. 2002, c. 29.
147. See Elizabeth Brandon, Does International Law Mean Anything in Canadian Courts?,
11 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 399 (2001).
148. See generally Robert Boardman, Milk-and-Potatoes Environmentalism: Canada and the
Turbulent World of International Law, in CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: CONTEXT AND
CASES, supra note 39, at 190.
149. See Maurice Strong, Beyond Rio: Prospects and Portents, 4 COL. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 21 (1993).
150. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 100-10, 26 I.L.M. 1541.
151. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 22, 2001, 40 I.L.M. 532.
152. See Who’s Who of Women and the Environment: Elizabeth Dowdeswell, UNITED
NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, http://www.unep.org/women_env/w_details.asp?w_id=223 (last
visited Sept. 3, 2010).
153. See WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T AND DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987).
154. See Julie Cohen, Warrior of the Waves, 74 GEOGRAPHICAL 54, 55–56 (2002).
155. Robert Paehlke, Environmentalism in One Country: Canadian Environmental Policy in
an Era of Globalization, 28 POL’Y STUD. J. 160, 163 (2005).
156. See Leigh Hancher & Michael Moran, Organizing Regulatory Space, in CAPITALISM,
CULTURE AND ECONOMIC REGULATION 271 (Leigh Hancher & Michael Moran eds., 1989);
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including disillusionment with the effectiveness of environmental
regulation, the influence of business over the regulatory process, and
greater appreciation that improved corporate environmental
performance can be financially beneficial to business. Private sector
engagement in Canadian environmental governance has grown
substantially since the 1970s.157 Much of it has involved the propagation of
voluntary codes of conduct.158 Perhaps the best example of Canadian
industry leadership is Responsible Care. Launched in 1985 by the
Canadian Chemical Producer’s Association, and now established as a
best practice standard worldwide, Responsible Care aims to have
participating firms “continuously improve their health, safety and
environmental performance, and to communicate with stakeholders
about their products and processes.”159 Although Responsible Care is
among the best known corporate environmental codes, as with most
examples of industry standards, it remains vulnerable to perfunctory
compliance and perpetuating business-as-usual behaviour because of the
lack of credible sanctions against laggards.160 The Canadian mining
industry, which has a huge environmental impact both within and beyond
Canada, has also developed its own environmental standards.161 It has
also pioneered the negotiation of “impact and benefit agreements” with
Aboriginal communities particularly affected by mining developments.162
Notwithstanding these individual examples of leadership, Canadian
businesses, like Canadian governments, are more importers than
exporters of environmental governance innovations, pushed by foreign
head offices, customers, and international trade associations to adopt
global environmental standards such as the Global Reporting Initiative
and ISO 14001.163
P.N. Grabosky, Green Markets: Environmental Regulation by the Private Sector, 16 L. & POL’Y
419 (1994).
157. See Douglas MacDonald, The Business Response to Environmentalism, in CANADIAN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: CONTEXT AND CASES, supra note 39, at 66.
158. See Wood, supra note 51.
159. RESPONSIBLE CARE, http://www.responsiblecare.org (last visited Oct. 4, 2010).
160. See Andrew King & Michael Lenox, Industry Self-regulation Without Sanctions: The
Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Program, 43 ACADEMY MGMT. J. 698 (2000).
161. See MINING ASS’N OF CAN., TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE MINING GUIDING PRINCIPLES
(2004), available at http://www.mining.ca/www/Towards_Sustaining_Mining/Guiding_Principles/
Guiding_Principles.php.
162. See STEVEN A. KENNETT, A GUIDE TO IMPACT AND BENEFITS AGREEMENTS (1999).
163. See STEPHEN CLARKSON & STEPAN WOOD, A PERILOUS IMBALANCE: THE
GLOBALIZATION OF CANADIAN LAW AND GOVERNANCE 234 (2010). The Global Reporting
Initiative is the world’s leading voluntary framework for sustainability reporting. See GLOBAL
REPORTING INITIATIVE, http://www.globalreporting.org (last visited Oct. 15, 2010). ISO 14001 is
the world’s leading voluntary standard for environmental management systems. See ISO 14000
Essentials, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/
management_and_leadership_standards/environmental_management/iso_14000_essentials.htm
(last visited Oct. 15, 2010).
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Despite these ongoing institutional reforms and realignments, it
would be misleading to conclude that Canada was on the brink of
achieving sustainability. Quite simply, the underlying ecological pressures
have continued to intensify. Canada’s population grew between 1 and 2
percent annually from 1970 to 1995, increasing from 21.3 million to 29.4
million.164 Its gross domestic product more than doubled in the same
period, from US$276.9 billion to US$592.1 billion in constant (2000)
dollars.165 Canadian environmental law had no demonstrable effect on
either of these trends. Energy use, a key marker of a society’s overall
environmental burden, rose in Canada from approximately 6476
kilograms of oil equivalent per capita in 1970 to 7866 in 1995, a 21.5
percent increase.166
Not only were the plethora of reforms unable to halt the incremental
pressures on Canada’s environment, they were vulnerable to revision if
they were perceived as incongruous with the dominant economic
interests.167 Environmental law prospered in Canada largely to the extent
it was perceived as compatible with a growing economy, such as being
able to reduce “waste” and inefficiency or to create new markets for
environmentally-conscious consumers and businesses. Only in relation to
Indigenous peoples and their land claims did lawmakers truly encounter
concerted pressure for an alternative and more ecologically sustainable
model of development.168
III. PARADISE DEFERRED
A.

An Unsustainable Environmental Record

The combination of factors that enabled environmental awareness
and institutional reforms to flourish in Canada during the 1970s and 1980s
had collapsed by the early 1990s. While the trend was not unique to
Canada,169 the decline there was particularly steep.170 According to a 1995
164. World Bank Data by Country: Canada, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/
country/canada (last visited Oct. 15, 2010); see also Population and Growth Components (18512001 Censuses), STATISTICS CANADA, http://www40.statcan.gc.ca/l01/cst01/DEMO03-eng.htm
(last visited Oct. 15, 2010).
165. World Bank Data by Country: Canada, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/
country/canada (last visited Oct. 15, 2010); see also World Economic Outlook Databases, INT’L
MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28 (last visited Oct. 15, 2010).
166. World Bank Data by Country: Canada, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.
org/country/canada (last visited Oct. 15, 2010).
167. See infra Parts IV.B–C.
168. See Benjamin J. Richardson, The Ties that Bind: Indigenous Peoples and Environmental
Governance, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE LAW: COMPARATIVE AND CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES 337, 363–65 (Benjamin J. Richardson, Shin Imai & Kent McNeil eds., 2009).
169. See Stephen Crook & Jan Pakulski, Shades of Green: Public Opinion on Environmental
Issues in Australia, 30 AUSTL. J. POL. SCI. 39 (1995); JANE KELSEY, ECONOMIC
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review of Canada’s environmental performance by the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the country faced
three main challenges: “difficulties in translating the concept [of
sustainable development] into practical changes in economic decisions
and practices and in economic signals; consumption and production
patterns, which are often intensive in their use of natural resources; and
increased concerns regarding the economy, employment and public
deficits, which tend to reduce the prominence of environmental
matters.”171 Because of these and other circumstances, Canada’s record
on many environmental indicators deteriorated both absolutely and
relatively to its peers.
While some notorious examples point to failures in specific policy
contexts, such as the spectacular collapse of the Atlantic cod fishery in
1993,172 other research documents a more systemic drift towards
unsustainability in Canada. According to a 2001 report by the University
of Victoria, Canada’s environmental performance is among the worst of
any industrialized country.173 Canada ranked twenty-eighth out of twentynine countries on twenty-five environmental indicators, outdone only by
the United States. In particular, Canada ranked among the bottom three
nations on nine indicators, including per capita greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions, sulphur dioxide emissions, carbon monoxide pollution, water
consumption, energy consumption, and generation of nuclear waste.
Canada again fared badly in a 2005 survey, ranking 28th out of 30 OECD
countries in terms of overall environmental performance.174 Further,
according to Professor Mark Winfield, “what improvements that have
been seen, such as reductions in the levels of emissions that cause acid
rain, can be almost entirely attributed to the residual effects of more
ambitious initiatives undertaken during the last major wave of public
concern for the environment, now nearly twenty years ago, rather than
the impact of any recent initiatives.”175
FUNDAMENTALISM: THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIMENT – A WORLD MODEL FOR STRUCTURAL
ADJUSTMENT? (1996).
170. See BOYD, supra note 3, passim; THE INTEGRITY GAP: CANADA’S ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY AND INSTITUTIONS (Eugene Lee & Anthony Perl eds., 2004).
171. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE
REVIEWS: CANADA 2 (1995).
172. See Ransom A. Myers, Jeffrey A. Hutchings & Nicholas J. Barrowman, Why Do Fish
Stocks Collapse? The Example of Cod in Atlantic Canada, 7 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 91
(1997).
173. See DAVID BOYD, CANADA VS. THE OECD: AN ENVIRONMENTAL COMPARISON
(2001), available at http://www.environmentalindicators.com.
174. See THOMAS I. GUNTON ET AL., THE MAPLE LEAF IN THE OECD: CANADA’S
PROGRESS TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY 6 (2005), available at http://www.davidsuzuki.org/
publications/reports/2005/the-maple-leaf-in-the-oecd-comparing-progress-toward-sustainability.
175. Mark S. Winfield, An Unimaginative People: Instrument Choice in Canadian
Environmental Law and Policy, 71 SASK. L. REV. 79, 80–81 (2008).
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One environmental indicator on which Canada appears to perform
comparatively well is biodiversity conservation. Its percentage of extinct
or endangered species is small compared with other countries. Over
approximately the past two-hundred years, Canada has experienced
eleven vertebrate fauna extinctions, compared to forty-two in Australia
and eighteen in New Zealand, and a far smaller proportion of its species
are currently endangered.176 However, this record owes largely to
Canada’s geography rather than better management of wildlife; Canada
is part of a large continent accustomed to species movement and greater
resilience, unlike island countries such as Australia and New Zealand
where species isolated from other regions evolved highly specialized
characteristics that made them more vulnerable to threats such as
competition from alien species.177
One aspect of Canada’s environmental dossier where there can be
no fudging the record is climate change. With about 0.5 percent of the
global population, Canada belches out nearly 2 percent of the world’s
GHG emissions.178 Canada’s emissions leapt by 32 percent from 1990 to
2005; yet by ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, it had agreed to cut its
emissions by 6 percent below 1990 levels by 2012.179 On a per capita basis,
Canadians emitted 22.6 tonnes of GHG emission (as carbon dioxide
equivalent) in 2005, almost double the average of 12.4 tonnes per capita
among its developed country peers, and second only to Australia.180 A
2006 study ranked Canada second-to-last in a comparison of climate
change policies in fifty-six industrialized and newly industrialized
countries.181 Finally, a 2009 report issued by the World Wildlife Fund and

176. See COMM. ON THE STATUS OF ENDANGERED SPECIES IN CAN., SUMMARY OF
COSEWIC ASSESSMENT RESULTS AS OF APRIL 2010 (2010), available at
http://www.cosewic.gc.ca/rpts/Full_List_Species.htm; AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, ASSESSMENT OF
AUSTRALIA’S TERRESTRIAL BIODIVERSITY 2008, at 80 (2009), available at
http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/publications/terrestrial-assessment/index.html; ROD
HITCHMOUGH, LEIGH BULL & PAM CROMARTY, NEW ZEALAND THREAT CLASSIFICATION
SYSTEM LISTS 2005, at 23 (2007).
177. See TIM FLANNERY, THE FUTURE EATERS: AN ECOLOGICAL HISTORY OF THE
AUSTRALASIAN LANDS AND PEOPLE 61–62, 237–41, 353, 356, 382, 387 (1994).
178. See Canada's Greenhouse-Gas Emissions Rose Sharply Between 1990 and 2005: Study,
CBC NEWS (Apr. 22, 2008), http://www.cbc.ca/technology/story/2008/04/22/tech-canadagreenhouse.html.
179. See Environment: GHG Emissions Per Capita, CONFERENCE BD. OF CANADA (Oct.
2008), http://www.conferenceboard.ca/hcp/details/environment/greenhouse-gas-emissions.aspx
(last visited Sept. 4, 2010).
180. See id.
181. See Press Release, Climate Action Network Canada, Government of Canada Next to
Bottom of the Class in Fighting Climate Change (Nov. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.climateactionnetwork.ca/e/news/2006/nairobi-2006-11-13.html.
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insurance giant Allianz placed Canada last among the G8 countries for
performance in addressing climate change.182
B.

An Environmental Law Backwater

Few would have predicted twenty years ago that Canada would
become such an environmental laggard. The 1990s began with great
promise, with the unveiling of the Green Plan, Canada’s active
international involvement, and the high public support expressed for
environmentally responsible policies. Before evaluating the causes of this
decline in Canada’s environmental record, it is useful to examine some of
its regulatory and policy symptoms and compare the Canadian
experience with the direction other countries took.
One of the most significant symptoms of decline is that Canadian
environmental law has increasingly lacked the cornucopia of policy
instruments found in comparable jurisdictions. Many Canadian regulators
have remained hinged to a simplistic conceptualization of policy
instrument choice as a binary choice between “command-and-control”
regulation and voluntary action.183 Other possibilities that have been
adopted in many countries, such as ecological tax reform,184 extended
producer responsibility,185 and tradable pollution allowances,186 have
lingered on the fringes of policy making in Canada. Although there have
some recent innovations at a provincial level, such as adoption of modest
carbon taxes in Quebec and British Columbia in 2007 and 2008
respectively, these steps were inspired by foreign examples. Canada may
be “innovating,” but, to a greater extent than earlier periods, more of the
inspiration comes from abroad.
The reticence of Canada’s lawmakers to use economic instruments is
one of the most notable lacunae in its environmental law. In many
jurisdictions, especially in the European Union, such instruments have
been deployed in diverse areas of environmental policy to create financial
incentives for improved corporate behaviour.187 The OECD advised

182. See Catherine Porter, Canada Dead Last on Green List, TORONTO STAR, July 1, 2009,
http://www.thestar.com/News/Canada/article/659218.
183. See BOYD, supra note 3, at 248.
184. See, e.g., Stefan Speck, The Design of Carbon and Broad-Based Energy Taxes in
European Countries, 10 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 31 (2008); Simon Dresner et al., Social and Political
Responses to Ecological Tax Reform in Europe: An Introduction to the Special Issue, 34 ENERGY
POL’Y 895 (2006).
185. See, e.g., Noah Sachs, Planning the Funeral at the Birth: Extended Producer
Responsibility in the European Union and the United States, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 51 (2006).
186. James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental
Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2000); Richard Schmalensee et al., An Interim Evaluation of Sulfur
Dioxide Emissions Trading, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 53 (1998).
187. On international practice, see ENVIRONMENTAL INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS
(Thomas H. Tietenberg, Kenneth Button & Peter Nijkamp eds., 1999); NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD
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Canada as early as 1995 to be more ambitious with economic
instruments.188 Some ad hoc initiatives have since occurred, such as an
amendment of the Income Tax Act in 1996 to encourage landowners to
donate ecologically significant land for conservation.189 Recent federal
initiatives on climate change also dabble with economic incentives, but
mainly in the form of subsidies for clean energy technology.190 More
radical alternatives, such as ecological tax reform, as proposed in the 2008
federal election by the Liberals and Greens,191 have been shunned by the
current Conservative government and were abandoned by the Liberals
after losing the election.192
Both the Liberals and Conservatives—Canada’s two major national
political parties—share blame for Canada’s intransigence on climate
change policy. The former Liberal governments of Jean Chrétien and
Paul Martin, while publicly keen on the Kyoto Protocol, were very slow
to develop climate change policies and failed to implement any significant
measures before they lost office in 2006.193 The subsequent Conservative
government of Stephen Harper has been overtly hostile to action on
climate change. While it has introduced some soft measures, including the
C$1 billion Green Infrastructure Fund to support projects such as public
transit, the government effectively disavowed Kyoto.194 And, as explained
later in this Article, it has sought to avoid meaningful compliance with

& CHARLES C. CALDART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, POLICY, AND ECONOMICS: RECLAIMING
ENVIRONMENTAL AGENDA (2008); 5 CRITICAL ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION:
INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Nathalie Chalifour et al. eds., 2008).
Regarding Canada’s weak use of economic instruments, see Wiktor Adamowicz, Reflections on
Environmental Policy in Canada, 55 CANADIAN J. AGRIC. ECON. 1, 1 (2007).
188. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., supra note 171, at 7.
189. See An Act to Amend the Income Tax Act, the Excise Act, the Excise Tax Act, the
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act, the Old Age Security Act and the
Canada Shipping Act, S.C. 1996, c. 21, s. 20; Stepan Wood, Canada’s “Forgotten Forests”: Or,
How Ottawa Is Failing Local Communities and the World in Peri-Urban Forest Protection, 14 J.
ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 217, 243 (2004); Toner, supra note 104, at 106.
190. See Canada’s Domestic Action, GOV’T CANADA (Oct. 15, 2010), http://www.climate
change.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=4FE85A4C-1.
191. See LIBERAL PARTY OF CAN., THE GREEN SHIFT: BUILDING A CANADIAN ECONOMY
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2008) (part of the party’s 2008 federal election platform); GREEN
PARTY OF CAN., LOOKING FORWARD: A FRESH PERSPECTIVE ON CANADA’S FUTURE (2008)
(2008 federal election platform).
192. See A Plan for the Economy vs. Proposals for Financial Disaster, CONSERVATIVE
PARTY OF CAN. (Oct. 7, 2008), http://www.conservative.ca/policy/plan (describing the party’s
2008 federal election platform); Les Whittington, Dion's Carbon Tax Plan Was a Vote Loser,
Ignatieff Says, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 28, 2009, at A8 (describing new federal Liberal leader’s
rejection of predecessor’s proposed carbon tax).
193. See Cass, supra note 4, at 474–75.
194. See Harper’s Letter Dismisses Kyoto as ‘Socialist Scheme’, CBC NEWS (Jan. 30, 2007),
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/01/30/harper-kyoto.html; Green Infrastructure Fund,
INFRASTRUCTURE CAN. (May 27, 2009), http://www.buildingcanada-chantierscanada
.gc.ca/media/news-nouvelles/2009/gif-fiv-eng.html.
THE
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the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act, 2007, sponsored by the
Opposition Parties.195
Although Canada has an international reputation for respecting
human rights and promoting citizen participation in public affairs, even
here some retreat is evident. One example is access to environmental
information. The Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters, drafted by the UN Economic Commission for Europe in 1998,196
spawned the creation of pollutant emission inventory systems throughout
much of Europe. Canada was once in the vanguard in this area, having
established a National Pollutant Release Inventory in 1992, second only
to the United States to do so.197 Today, Canada has declined to ratify the
Aarhus Convention and its supplementary 2003 protocol on pollutant
release registers.198
In addition to legislative inaction, Canada’s poor record also owes to
its failure to implement existing laws. One instance is a landmark
provision in the amended Canada National Parks Act which made
ecological integrity the “first priority” in all decisions affecting park
management.199 Despite this statutory mandate, subsequent parks
management, dominated by the traditional “parks for people” ethos, has
struggled to fulfill this goal.200 Parks Canada’s practices have been
challenged, but in virtually all cases the courts have deferred to its
judgment. For example, in May 2001 the Minister of Canadian Heritage,
on behalf of Parks Canada, authorized construction of a winter road
through Wood Buffalo National Park.201 The Federal Court rejected the
arguments of the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society that the
Minister had failed to comply with the Canada National Parks Act’s
ecological integrity requirement. Judge Gibson reasoned that the Act
“requires a delicate balancing of conflicting interests which include the

195. S.C. 2007, c. 30.
196. See Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447.
197. The United States established a Toxics Release Inventory in 1988. See Emergency
Planning & Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11001–11050; Toxics Release
Inventory Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/tri (last visited Oct. 15,
2010).
198. See Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447; Draft Protocol on
Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers to the Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, opened for
signature May 21, 2003, available at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/e-mop.htm.
199. See S.C. 2000, c. 32, s. 8(2).
200. See Shaun Fluker, Ecological Integrity in Canada’s National Parks: The False Promise
of Law, 29 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 89 (2010).
201. See Canadian Parks and Wilderness Soc’y v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage),
[2002] 2 F.C. D-8 (Trial Div.), aff’d, [2003] 4 F.C. 672.
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benefit and enjoyment of those living in, and in close proximity to, Wood
Buffalo National Park . . . [and] does not require that ecological integrity
be the ‘determinative factor.’”202
Meanwhile, other countries have embraced reform, in turn setting
precedents to guide Canada–in contrast to earlier times when Canada
pioneered some best practices. Over the past decade, California and
Germany, for instance, have adopted various incentive measures and
regulatory standards to promote energy efficiency and uptake of
renewable energies.203 Ontario’s recent “green energy” statutory reforms,
including a feed-in tariff system to support renewable energy production,
were inspired by these examples.204 Not all precedents have been positive,
however. The United States, nearly always a significant influence on
Canadian environmental regulation,205 is also setting the bar low on
climate change policy: the Harper government insists that it will deal with
climate change only in a manner consistent with American efforts.206
Further evidence of Canada’s trailing performance is in the area of
pollution regulation.207 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s
Project XL substituted traditional emission controls designed and
mandated by government with a pollution control regime determined
between government, the regulated entity, and other stakeholders.208 Its
Performance Track program offered regulatory and other benefits to
hundreds of companies and public sector facilities that had environmental
management systems in place and adopted ambitious beyond-compliance
environmental performance targets.209 Meanwhile, the Australian state of
Victoria pioneered another approach to regulatory flexibility, allowing
companies to prepare an “environmental improvement” plan as a partial
alternative to environmental licensing systems.210
Some Canadian governments have begun to adopt their own
schemes for regulatory flexibility, such as Ontario’s Environmental
202. Id. paras. 52–53.
203. See Kevin S. Golden, Senate Bill 1078: The Renewable Portfolio Standard – California
Asserts Its Renewable Energy Leadership, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 693 (2003); Rolf Wüstenhagen &
Michael Bilharz, Green Energy Market Development in Germany: Effective Public Policy and
Emerging Customer Demand, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 1681 (2006).
204. See Green Energy Act, S.O. 2009, c. 12.
205. See George Hoberg, Sleeping with an Elephant: The American Influence on Canadian
Environmental Regulation, 11 J. PUB. POL’Y 107 (1991). One earlier example of such influence
was environmental impact assessment law. See Toner, supra note 104, at 93.
206. Gloria Galloway & Nathan Vanderklippe, Canada Ties New Emissions-Cuts Targets to
U.S. Goals, GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 1, 2010, at A6.
207. See Abbott, supra note 36, at 89–90.
208. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282, 27,287 (May 23,
1995).
209. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF POLICY, ECON. & INNOVATION,
PERFORMANCE TRACK FINAL PROGRESS REPORT (2009).
210. See ENV’T PROT. AUTH. VICT., GUIDELINES FOR THE PREPARATION OF
ENVIRONMENT IMPROVEMENT PLANS 1 (2002).
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Leaders Program, introduced in 2002.211 Some of these initiatives reflect
the New Public Management model of administration.212 One example,
cited by Professor Winfield, is the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources’
restructuring in the late 1990s of its compliance inspection system for
forestry operations into a “partnership” with the logging industry.213 The
majority of the Ministry’s inspectors were retrenched, and replaced by a
model of self-inspection by the logging companies. Similar arrangements
were established in other natural resource sectors in the province,
including for mining and fisheries management.214 Their effectiveness in
identifying and reporting non-compliance has been questioned.215 The
very notion of “regulatory flexibility” has attracted criticism as a return to
a “bipartite bargaining” model of policy making, privileging the state and
industry while marginalizing community involvement and public
accountability.216
Another example of the New Public Management model is the
delegation of public service delivery to arms-length agencies. This trend,
pioneered in the United Kingdom and New Zealand, was inspired by the
idea that government should “steer,” not “row.”217 In practice, however,
these agencies have limited accountability and are often run by the
regulated industries themselves. “Rather than ‘steering,’” wrote Professor
Winfield and others of an Ontario example, “the government provided
the boat, but largely left the authority to define its own course and
speed.”218 These concerns were borne out in many people’s minds in 2008
when a massive explosion destroyed a propane storage facility regulated
by the Technical Standards and Safety Authority, resulting in two
deaths.219 According to Professor Winfield, this tragedy highlighted
several shortcomings of such arms-length regulatory agencies, including a
lack of transparency, limited public accountability, and risk of capture by

211. See Ontario’s Environmental Leaders: Benefits of the Program, ONT.: MINISTRY OF THE
ENV’T, http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/en/general/oel/benefits.php (last modified June 23, 2009).
212. See Winfield, supra note 175, at 85; see also NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION IN CANADA (Mohamed Charih & Arthur Daniels eds., 1997).
213. See Mark Winfield, Alternative Service Delivery in the Natural Resources Sector: An
Examination of Ontario’s Forestry Compliance Self-inspection System, 48 CAN. PUB. ADMIN. 552, 552
(2005).
214. Id. at 554.
215. Id.
216. George Hoberg, Environmental Policy: Alternative Styles, in GOVERNING CANADA:
INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 307, 314 (Michael Atkinson ed., 1993).
217. DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 25 (1993).
218. Mark S. Winfield, David Whorley & Shelley Beth Kaufman, Public Safety in Private
Hands: A Study of Ontario’s Technical Standards and Safety Authority, 45 CAN. PUB. ADMIN. 24,
34 (2002).
219. See Mark Winfield, Public Safety in Private Hands: Rethinking the TSSA Model,
TORONTO STAR, Aug. 29, 2008, available at http://www.thestar.com/comment/article/487433.

2RICHARDSON-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1014

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

3/3/2011 10:14 AM

[Vol. 37:981

regulated industries.220 More fundamentally, this case exposed the falsity
of the claim that governments can simply “steer” while allowing
regulated industries to “row,” because the supposedly “operational”
functions of approvals and inspections are in practice “crucial sources of
information about what is happening in the real world that influence the
formulation of policy.”221 Despite these problems, some Canadian
governments continue to float the idea of adopting a similar model for
environmental regulation.222
The financial economy is another domain where Canada is a legal
backwater. A new international frontier of environmental law reform is
socially responsible investment, which can provide a means of
encouraging lenders and investors to discriminate among companies
based on their sustainability performance.223 Since the early 2000s, several
European countries and Australia have introduced regulations requiring
pension funds and other types of financial institutions to disclose their
policies for taking into account social, environmental, and ethical matters
in investment decisions.224 Public sector pension funds in Norway,
Sweden, and New Zealand have even been mandated by legislation to
invest ethically and responsibly.225 Economic incentives to stimulate
socially responsible investment (SRI) have also been adopted in some
jurisdictions; the leading example, the Netherlands’ Green Project
Directive of 1995,226 has greatly spurred the Dutch SRI market.227
Canada has largely shunned such ideas. Calls to reform the statutory
mandate of the Canada Pension Plan have been rejected, and an
opposition private member’s bill in 2001, modeled on Britain’s law

220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See Bill 68, Open for Business Act of 2010 (2d Sess., 39th Leg., Ontario, 59 Eliz. II),
sched. 7; Modernizing Environmental Approvals, ONT. MINISTRY OF THE ENV’T,
http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/en/business/mofa/index.php (last visited Oct. 6, 2010).
223. See BENJAMIN J. RICHARDSON, SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT LAW:
REGULATING THE UNSEEN POLLUTERS (2008).
224. See Benjamin J. Richardson, Pensions Law Reform and Environmental Policy: A New
Role for Institutional Investors?, 3 J. INT’L FIN. MARKETS: L. & REG. 159, 162–66 (2002).
225. See U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME FINANCE INITIATIVE (UNEPFI) & UK SOCIAL
INVESTMENT FORUM, RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT IN FOCUS: HOW LEADING PUBLIC PENSION
FUNDS ARE MEETING THE CHALLENGE 14–16, 46–48 (2007); New Zealand Superannuation and
Retirement Income Act 2001, No. 84, s. 58.
226. The scheme was revamped and extended in 2002 and 2005. See Regeling groenprojecten
buitenland [Regulation on Green Projects Abroad], STAATSCOURANT (Neth.), Jan. 2, 2002, at 31;
Regeling groenprojecten [Regulation on Green Projects], STAATSCOURANT (Neth.), July 11, 2005,
at 131.
227. See SUSTAINABLE PROFIT: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS
GENERATED BY THE GREEN FUNDS SCHEME 6–7 (2002), available at http://www.senternovem.
nl/mmfiles/sustainable_profit_tcm24-196677.pdf.
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providing for disclosure of SRI policies, failed to pass.228 Another
example is the Ontario Securities Commission’s rejection in January 2010
of proposed new regulations to enhance corporate environmental
reporting.229 Even Canada’s National Round Table on the Environment
and Economy, often an advocate for innovation, recommended in its
2007 report on this subject that “we do not see the need for increased
regulation, increased taxation, or increased interference in the normal
value-creating activities of Canadian businesses.”230 Instead, just a few
modest steps have been taken. An archaic rule prohibiting shareholders
from filing resolutions directed towards “promoting general economic,
political, racial, religious, social or similar causes” was finally removed
from the federal corporations law in 2001.231 And in 2002, the federal
government passed a public disclosure regulation, against the wishes of
banks, requiring them to publish an annual “public accountability
statement” describing their contribution to the Canadian economy and
society.232 These changes are relatively insignificant compared to moves
by other countries,233 and reflect the limits of Canada’s once-lauded
innovation.
The foregoing is not a comprehensive account of Canada’s slide into
an environmental law backwater, but indicates a general trend. Although
it has been shown that some comparable jurisdictions continue to pioneer
environmental law reform, this should not imply that they have put their
economies on a sustainable footing. Far from it; all countries are
struggling to achieve effective legal and policy responses to worsening
environmental conditions. However, even with that caveat, Canada has
tended to perform worse.

228. See Bill C-394, An Act to Amend the Pension Benefits Standards Act of 1985 (Sept. 20,
2001). The bill was modeled on the UK precedent by its requirement that pension funds disclose
whether or not they have an investment policy for addressing social and ethical issues, but (also
as in the UK) the pension funds were not required to adopt a policy for SRI.
229. See Doug Watt, Ontario Regulator Backs Off on ESG Rules, SRI MONITOR (Jan. 14,
2010, 11:16 AM), http://srimonitor.blogspot.com/2010/01/ontario-regulator-backs-off-onesg.html.
230. NAT’L ROUND TABLE ON THE ENV’T & ECON., CAPITAL MARKETS AND
SUSTAINABILITY: INVESTING IN A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE: STATE OF THE DEBATE REPORT 3
(2007).
231. Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, s. 137(5), amended by S.C. 2001, c. 14,
s. 59.
232. Public Accountability Statements (Banks, Insurance Companies, Trust and Loan
Companies) Regulations, SOR/2002-133. The regulations were imposed in the context of a wave
of mergers in the banking industry that raised concerns about an unhealthy concentration of
power among a few large lenders. See MURRAY COOKE, BANKING ON MERGERS: FINANCIAL
POWER VERSUS THE PUBLIC INTEREST 36–37 (2005).
233. For comparison of SRI-related legal reforms in other jurisdictions, see RICHARDSON,
supra note 223, at 303–75.
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IV. REASONS FOR CANADA’S ENVIRONMENTAL LAW DECLINE
Canada’s apparent decline as an environmental law leader can be
explained partly by acknowledging that Canada was never quite the
innovator it was reputed to be. Yet even accepting this deflated
reputation, it experienced a genuine stagnation of environmental law
reform in the 1990s. Several factors contributed to this situation.234 The
effects of globalization on Canada, as a trade-oriented commodity
exporter, were increasingly significant, limiting the scope for
environmental policies that would hinder extractive industries and other
economic sectors that Canadian policy makers wished to be
internationally competitive.235 While the domestic mining and forestry
sector have staggered under the effects of globalization, its obstructive
influence on environmental policy persisted as governments continued to
tie their fortunes to those of the industries on which Canada’s economy
had long depended.
The cyclical nature of public concern for the environment was
another salient factor, having emerged strongly in the 1970s and peaking
in the late 1980s, after which it declined sharply. The tensions in Canada’s
federal system, epitomized by the narrowly defeated Quebec sovereignty
referendum in 1995, led federal authorities to be less assertive in
environmental affairs.236 Concurrently, the growing influence of neoliberal philosophy in Canadian public policy curbed state activism except
to reinforce market forces.237 Neo-liberalism was embraced to varying
degrees by federal and provincial governments of all political stripes.
Budgets of environment and natural resources departments were cut by
some 30 to 60 percent as governments slashed deficits.238 Another
obstacle to government action during this period was the “first past the
post” (FPTP) electoral system, in which the candidate with the most
votes wins each riding, while the other candidates’ votes count for
nothing electorally. This system limits representation of smaller,
environmental and social justice-oriented parties in provincial and federal
legislatures even when they capture a substantial share of the popular
vote.

234. See Paehlke, supra note 155 (discussing reasons for decline of Canadian environmental
law and policy); Winfield, supra note 175, at 79–80 (ditto).
235. See infra Part IV.C.
236. See Mark Winfield, Policy Instruments in Canadian Environmental Policy, in
CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND POLITICS 46, 56 (Debora L. VanNijnatten and
Robert Boardman eds., 2009).
237. See David Clark, Neoliberalism and Public Service Reform: Canada in Comparative
Perspective, 35 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 771 (2002); Anita Kranjc, Whither Ontario’s Environment: NeoConservatism and the Decline of the Ministry of the Environment, 26 CAN PUB. POL. 111 (2000).
238. See BOYD, supra note 3, at 239–40.
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In this section we canvas four of these influences on contemporary
Canadian environmental law: federal-provincial relations, neo-liberal
ideology, Canada’s resource-based economy, and electoral politics.
A.

Federalism and Environmental Policy

Environmental regulation faces hurdles in federal systems that are
largely absent in unitary states. One order of government must often
overcome resistance at the other level to achieve environmental
protection goals.239 In the Canadian case, the primary obstacle to national
leadership on the environment is a lack of political will on the part of
successive federal governments rather than constitutionally imposed
jurisdictional constraints.240 The provinces’ power to legislate in relation
to the environment is admittedly broad, given their constitutional
jurisdiction over mines, minerals, forestry, electricity, non-federal public
lands, municipal institutions, property, civil rights, and matters of a local
or private nature.241 The federal government nonetheless enjoys
substantial environmental regulatory competence due to its constitutional
powers over fisheries, shipping, navigation, criminal law, federal lands
and “undertakings,” Aboriginal lands and peoples, trade and commerce,
taxing and spending, and matters of demonstrated national concern or
emergency.242
The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly affirmed a substantial
role for the federal government in environmental regulation, calling
environmental protection a fundamental value of Canadian society and a
major challenge requiring action by all levels of government.243 It has
confirmed that environmental protection cuts across many areas of
federal and provincial jurisdiction244 and that governments at all levels—
239. Taking action to cut GHG emissions is one prominent example. See Gordon Smith &
David Victor, Beyond Kyoto, in HARD CHOICES: CLIMATE CHANGE IN CANADA 215, 221
(Harold Coward & Andrew J. Weaver eds., 2004); DAVID SUZUKI FOUNDATION, PROVINCIAL
POWER PLAY: BREAKING AWAY FROM FEDERAL INACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2008).
240. See BOYD, supra note 3, at 92–93; Shi-Ling Hsu & Robin Elliot, Regulating Greenhouse
Gases in Canada: Constitutional and Policy Dimensions, 54 MCGILL L.J. 463, 472–74 (2009).
241. See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, §§ 92, 92A, 109 (U.K.), reprinted in
R.S.C. 1985, app. II, no. 5 (Can.).
242. See id. § 91; Steven Kennett, Federal Environmental Jurisdiction after Oldman, 31
MCGILL L.J. 180, 197 (1992). “Federal undertakings” include enterprises, organizations,
projects, and activities of the federal government itself or under federal jurisdiction. PATRICK
MONAHAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 359 (3d ed. 2006).
243. See, e.g., British Columbia v. Canadian Forest Prods. Ltd., [2004] 2 S.C.R. 74, para. 7;
114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’Arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241,
para. 1; R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213, para. 85; Ontario v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., [1995]
2 S.C.R. 1031, para. 55.
244. See, e.g., Friends of the Oldman River Soc’y v. Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 1
S.C.R. 3; R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213; Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Quebec (Minister of the
Environment), [2003] S.C.R. 624; British Columbia v. Canadian Forest Prods. Ltd., [2004] 2
S.C.R. 74.
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including municipalities—may exercise leadership so long as they respect
constitutional constraints.245 Thus, in the 1980s, the Court upheld a
federal law prohibiting the deposit of polluting substances into water
frequented by fish as a valid exercise of the fisheries power,246 and a
federal marine pollution statute as a matter of “national concern.”247 In
both cases the result was to give the federal government substantial
power to regulate not just marine but land-based activities taking place
entirely within provincial territory and involving otherwise provincially
regulated industries. In the 1990s the Court confirmed the applicability of
federal environmental assessment law to a hydroelectric dam built in
Alberta as a valid exercise of the federal power over navigation,248 and
upheld Ottawa’s landmark toxic substances legislation under the federal
criminal law power.249 The effect of the latter case was to confirm that the
federal government may use its criminal law power to create complicated
environmental regulatory schemes, so long as they exhibit the
“prohibition-coupled-with-penalty” character of criminal law.250
The federal government also derives some environmental regulatory
power from its exclusive jurisdiction over “Indians, and Lands reserved
for Indians.”251 While Aboriginal rights are constitutionally protected
under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act of 1982,252 the Supreme Court
has affirmed that Ottawa may regulate and infringe those rights subject to
certain requirements of consultation and justification.253 Canada has
enacted a variety of measures governing land use and environmental
protection on Aboriginal territory, such as the First Nations Land
Management Act of 1999254 and the comprehensive land claims
agreements.255 Conversely, the provinces’ authority to enact
environmental laws over lands subject to Aboriginal legal interests is
severely limited.256 Therefore, although it would appear at first glance
that the provinces take precedence over Ottawa in many environmental

245. See 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d'arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2
S.C.R. 40.
246. See R. v. Nw. Falling Contractors Ltd., [1980] 2 S.C.R. 292.
247. R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401.
248. See Friends of the Oldman River Soc’y, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3.
249. See Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213.
250. Hsu & Elliot, supra note 240, at 491–93.
251. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3, § 91(24) (U.K.).
252. Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35(1), being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11
(U.K.).
253. See R. v Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3
S.C.R. 1010.
254. S.C. 1999, c. 24.
255. See John Merritt & Terry Fenge, Nunavut Land Claims Settlement: Emerging Issues in
Law and Public Administration, 15 QUEEN’S L.J. 255 (1990).
256. See Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511;
Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia, [2007] B.C.S.C. 1700 (Can. B.C.).
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issues, the powers left to the national government in the federal structure
give it significant leeway to pass environmental laws.
The constitutional division of powers is also relevant to the
implementation of international environmental treaties. Whereas the
federal government has exclusive jurisdiction to make treaties, it does not
have exclusive power to implement them, unlike the Australian federal
government which can give effect domestically to most international
treaties it ratifies by virtue of its “external affairs” constitutional power.257
In Canada, treaties must be implemented by the level of government
having jurisdiction over their subject-matter, often requiring legislation
by all ten provinces.258 Ottawa sometimes works around this constraint by
making “federal state” reservations to treaties, or claiming that existing
legislation is sufficient to implement new treaties.259 But ultimately, within
their jurisdictional spheres the provincial governments have control over
how effectively Canada’s international treaty obligations are fulfilled.
In sum, while jurisdictional constraints are real, the Constitution
provides room for both federal and provincial leadership in
environmental policy. The pattern has however been one of federal
deference, with an emphasis on cooperation and harmonization. The
Canada-Wide Accord on Environmental Harmonization,260 concluded in
1998 amidst widespread yet dubious complaints of unnecessary
duplication of federal and provincial legislation, put the provinces firmly
in the driver’s seat and barred the federal government from acting
whenever a province is designated the “lead” authority.261 The Canadian
Environmental Protection Act of 1999 and the Canadian Environmental
Assessment Act also contemplate a role for the provinces if they have
equivalent standards.262 Such concessions can give provincial governments
the final say on how strict environmental assessments will be,263 allowing
the federal government to delegate environmental responsibilities to the
provinces.
257. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 51.
258. See PAUL MULDOON, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY IN
CANADA 21 (2009).
259. See Joanna Harrington, Redressing the Democratic Deficit in Treaty-Making: (Re-)
Establishing a Role for Parliament, 50 MCGILL L.J. 465, 483 (2005); Brandon, supra note 147, at
405.
260. CANADIAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE ENV’T, A CANADA-WIDE ACCORD ON
ENVIRONMENTAL HARMONIZATION (1998), available at http://www.ccme.ca/assets/pdf/accord
_harmonization_e.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2010).
261. See Marcia Valiante, Legal Foundations of Canadian Environmental Policy:
Underlining Our Values in a Shifting Landscape, in CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:
CONTEXT AND CASES, supra note 39, at 3, 8.
262. Canadian Environmental Protection Act of 1999, S.C. 1999, c. 33 s. 4(1)(b.2); Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37 s. 54(1).
263. See MELODY HESSING, MICHAEL HOWLETT & TRACY SUMMERVILLE, CANADIAN
NATURAL RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 205 (2005).
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The results differ substantially. While some provinces have enacted
equivalent or stronger environmental rules, such as Nova Scotia’s
ambitious Environmental Goals and Sustainable Prosperity Act of
2007,264 others have taken advantage of Ottawa’s timidity to keep their
own laws weak.265 For example, Alberta’s environmental assessment
regulations exempt oil and gas exploration,266 and in Newfoundland and
Labrador the process only applies at the discretion of the minister.267
Environmental organizations have criticized federal-provincial
harmonization for all these reasons.268
This pattern of cooperation and federal devolution is occasionally
punctuated by competitive episodes in which federal or provincial
governments raise environmental standards in response to public
agitation, but this is usually followed by relatively long periods of
collaboration and downward harmonization.269 Ironically, the assumption
that duplication of federal and provincial regulation is always bad persists
among Canadian policy makers despite mounting evidence that some
degree of regulatory redundancy is critical to protect against
environmental and public health dangers such as drinking water
contamination.270 In any event we are left with a situation where willing
provinces, such as Nova Scotia, can take a leadership role, while others,
such as Alberta, may take advantage of jurisdictional ambiguity to stymie
both provincial and federal efforts.
B.

Neo-Liberalism and Deregulation

Neo-liberalism, which calls for the restriction of state intervention
except to liberate and strengthen market forces,271 was and remains
another seminal influence on Canadian environmental law. After its
initial electoral successes in the United Kingdom and United States in the
early 1980s, it gained traction in Canada with the federal election of 1988,
264. S.N.S. 2007, c. 7.
265. See HESSING, supra note 263, at 206.
266. See Environmental Assessment (Mandatory and Exempted Activities) Regulation, A.
Reg. 111/93, sched. 2(d)–(e).
267. See Environmental Protection Act, S.N.L. 2002, c. E-14.2, pt. X.
268. See Paehlke, supra note 155, at 173; Canadian Envtl. Law Ass’n v. Canada (Minister of
Env’t), [1999] 3 F.C. 564 (Trial Div.), aff’d [2000] 4 F.C. D-6 (C.A.) (dismissing application for
declaration that Canada-Wide Accord on Environmental Harmonization invalid).
269. See Nancy Olewiler, Environmental Policy in Canada: Harmonized at the Bottom?, in
RACING TO THE BOTTOM? PROVINCIAL INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE CANADIAN FEDERATION
113, 140 (Kathryn Harrison ed., 2006).
270. See, e.g., DENNIS R. O’CONNOR, REPORT OF THE WALKERTON INQUIRY, PART TWO:
A STRATEGY FOR SAFE DRINKING WATER 71–78 (2002) (recommending a multi-barrier
approach to drinking water safety).
271. Simon Lee & Stephen McBride, Introduction: Neo-Liberalism, State Power and Global
Governance in the Twenty-First Century, in NEO-LIBERALISM, STATE POWER AND GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 1, 6 (Simon Lee & Stephen McBride eds., 2003),

2RICHARDSON-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

3/3/2011 10:14 AM

1021

which Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s Progressive Conservatives won
on a platform of free trade with the United States and neo-liberal
restructuring of the Canadian state.272 The 1990s saw the election of
radically neo-liberal governments in Alberta and Ontario. Although less
extreme in rhetoric, the deficit-slaying, budget-cutting federal Liberal
government of 1993–2006 also embraced key elements of the neo-liberal
agenda. Among the strongest proponents of this agenda are public choice
theorists,273 who proposed the notion of government failure as an
ideological counterpoint to the rhetoric of “market failure.”274 Public
choice analysts apply the logic of microeconomics to politics, concluding
that whereas self-interest has a benign effect in the marketplace, it has a
corrupting influence on governmental decision making.275 Neo-liberalism
suggests we can avoid these problems of agency capture and rent-seeking
by shifting management and sometimes ownership of resources and
services beyond elected representatives and administrators.276
Environmental regulation has thus become a major target of neo-liberal
criticism.277
Several factors contributed to neo-liberalism’s strong resonance in
Canada, including the backlash against Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s
1980 effort to “Canadianize” the largely U.S.-controlled oil and gas
industry, two severe recessions, ballooning public deficits, major
Canadian business groups’ embrace of free trade as their only hope, and a
major public inquiry’s conclusion that the Canadian welfare state was
bloated and broken.278 By the 1990s, when governmental “red tape” and
wasteful spending became demonized as barriers to economic prosperity,
national and provincial environment ministries were severely purged.279

272. See CLARKSON & WOOD, supra note 163, at 69.
273. Among the various strands of public choice theory, see Richard Posner, Theories of
Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. 353 (1974); Charles Rowley, Public Choice and the
Economic Analysis of Law, in LAW AND ECONOMICS 155 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1989). The
“Chicago” strand of public choice theory, associated with Posner, explains regulation in terms of
supply and demand for political outcomes, while the “Virginia” school, associated with Rowley,
offers an institutional analysis, focusing on the mechanics of democratic political markets.
274. See Richard Nelson, Roles of Government in a Mixed Economy, 6 J. POL. ANAL. &
MGMT. 541, 542, 556 (1987) (noting that “government is subject to its own set of constraints and
limitations”).
275. See generally JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); WILLIAM NISKANEN,
BUREAUCRACY: SERVANT OR MASTER? (1973).
276. See DANIEL FARBER & PHILIP FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 67–69 (1991).
277. See CUTTING GREEN TAPE: TOXIC POLLUTANTS, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
AND THE LAW (Richard Stroup, Roger Meiners & Kip Viscusi eds., 2000); TERRY ANDERSON &
DONALD LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991) (arguing that detailed
environmental regulations administered by bureaucratic agencies tend to be inefficient, costly,
and sometimes even ineffective at improving environmental conditions).
278. CLARKSON & WOOD, supra note 163, at 66–67.
279. Id. at 195.
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In Ontario, the Ministry of the Environment under the Conservative
government of Mike Harris suffered a calamitous drop in annual funding
from $550 million in 1994 to $223 million by 2000.280 This led to the
closure or curtailment of many programs, reduced environmental
monitoring and enforcement, and significant staff cuts. Staffing levels at
Ontario’s Ministry of Natural Resources were slashed from 6639 in 1995
to 3380 in 2000.281 The provincial government also “downloaded” various
responsibilities, such as for water and sewage services, to municipalities
that lacked the resources to assume effective custody.282 In 1999, the
independent Environmental Commissioner of Ontario concluded in her
annual report that the “evidence of the deterioration of the province’s
environmental protection standards is widespread.”283 This situation was
not unique to Ontario; between 1992 and 1997 Alberta reportedly cut 30
percent of its environmental portfolio budget, while Newfoundland cut its
budget by nearly 60 percent.284 Even with the election of an apparently
more environmentally-minded Liberal government in Ontario 2003, these
funding shortfalls have yet to be recovered. In 2007 the Environmental
Commissioner of Ontario released a special report on the legacy of
earlier cuts,285 and noted elsewhere that “the need to rebuild the expertise
and resources available to” these ministries has “become a matter of
urgency.”286
These cuts did not come without costs. One of the tragic
consequences of these reductions and other deregulatory measures was
the contamination of the water supply of the town of Walkerton, Ontario,
by E. coli in May 2000, which resulted in the deaths of seven people and
illness of a further 2500.287 For similar reasons, a drinking water

280. See Karen Clark, The Top 10 Things Wrong with Environmental Protection under the
Common Sense Revolution, 25 INTERVENOR 3 (2000).
281. See id.
282. See Municipal Water and Sewage Transfer Act, S.O. 1997, c. 6.
283. See BOYD, supra note 3, at 241.
284. David McLaren, A Briefing on the Harmonization Accord, 23 INTERVENOR (1998),
available at http://www.cela.ca/article/canadian-environmental-protection-act-1999-first-cepareview/briefing-harmonization-accord.
285. See ENVTL. COMM’R OF ONT., DOING LESS WITH LESS: HOW SHORTFALLS IN
BUDGET, STAFFING AND IN-HOUSE EXPERTISE ARE HAMPERING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
MOE AND MNR (2007).
286. ENVTL. COMM’R OF ONT., GETTING TO K(NO)W: ANNUAL REPORT 2007–2008, at 74
(2007).
287. The resulting public inquiry concluded that funding cuts to drinking water monitoring
programs and lack of follow-up by environment ministry officials were principal causes of the
contamination. See DENNIS R. O’CONNOR, REPORT OF THE WALKERTON INQUIRY, PART ONE:
THE EVENTS OF MAY 2000 AND RELATED ISSUES 34–35 (2002); see also Scott Prudham,
Poisoning the Well: Neoliberalism and the Contamination of Municipal Water in Walkerton,
Ontario, 35 GEOFORUM 343 (2004).
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contamination outbreak occurred in North Battleford, Saskatchewan in
2001, leaving some 7000 people ill and leading to a lengthy class action.288
At the federal level, cuts were made to environmental programs
under both Liberal and Conservative governments. They began as early
as the mid-1980s under the Conservative Mulroney Government.289 The
Chrétien Liberals later slashed Environment Canada’s budget by almost
one-third between 1995 and 1997.290 Under Prime Minister Harper, the
budgets for the Environmental Monitoring and Assessment Network, the
Migratory Bird Program and the National Wildlife Areas have been
slashed and climate change research programs terminated.291 Although in
2009 the Harper Government established a “green infrastructure” fund to
support projects such as new public transit, its response to the economic
downturn has mainly been to reduce environmental requirements for
some projects, such as energy developments.292
One might think that embrace of the neo-liberal agenda, with its
emphasis on less reliance on government bureaucracy and more use of
market forces, would lead to greater reliance on economic policy
instruments as a means of environmental law. In principle, the creation of
markets for environmental goods and services, such as through tradable
pollution allowances and removal of market-distorting subsidies for
environmentally burdensome sectors such as the forestry and petroleum
industries, would seem to dovetail with policies designed to harness
market forces.293 As we have seen, however, the provincial and federal
governments that embraced neo-liberalism most strongly favoured
“voluntary” approaches to environmental management and continued to
lavish subsidies on polluting sectors such as mining and petroleum rather
than use economic disincentives to stimulate change.294

288. See Talks Underway to End Tainted Water Lawsuit, CBC NEWS (May 19, 2009),
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/saskatchewan/story/2009/05/19/north-battleford-water-lawsuit123.html.
289. See HARRISON, supra note 119, at 98.
290. See STEPHEN CLARKSON, UNCLE SAM AND US: GLOBALIZATION, NEOCONSERVATISM
AND THE CANADIAN STATE 340 (2002).
291. See Environment Canada Budget Cuts Threaten Wildlife Programs, CBC NEWS (Sept.
19. 2007), http://www.cbc.ca/news/yourview/2007/09/environment_canada _budget_cuts.html;
Tories Plan Cuts to Climate Change Programs, CBC NEWS (Apr. 5, 2006),
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/04/05/climate-change060405.html.
292. See Press Release, Infrastructure Canada, Canada Launches $1-billion Green
Infrastructure
Fund
(May
29,
2009),
available
at
http://www.buildingcanadachantierscanada.gc.ca/media/news-nouvelles/2009/20090529whitehorse-eng.html; Elizabeth May,
Stephen Harper Budget Worsens Ecological, Fiscal, Democratic Deficits, STRAIGHT.COM (May 5,
2010), available at http://www.straight.com/article-296471/vancouver/elizabeth-may-stephenharper-budget-worsens-ecological-fiscal-democratic-deficits.
293. See Robert Hahn & Robert Stavins, Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection:
Integrating Theory and Practice, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 464, 464–65 (1992).
294. See Winfield, supra note 175, at 87–88.
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The promotion of voluntary approaches and public-private
partnerships in Canada tended to become an excuse for business-asusual. One example is the 1995 National Action Program on Climate
Change, in which Canada identified “implementation of voluntary
actions” as a key component of the Program’s plan for meeting the
country’s international commitments.295 These actions, such as voluntary
commitments made by major GHG emitters, were unsuccessful.296 The
federal government’s voluntary Accelerated Reduction and Elimination
of Toxics program was criticized for similar reasons.297 In other contexts,
reliance on voluntary measures even contributed to environmental
disasters, most notably Walkerton’s contaminated drinking water
tragedy.298
While neo-liberalism has been in retreat in recent years due to its
politically unacceptable outcomes and economic impacts, including the
global financial crisis of 2008,299 Canadian governments’ preference for
minimal market regulation lingers. Policy making remains dominated by
economic considerations of promoting employment, consumer spending,
and international trade. In this framework, the environmental policies
most likely to win political support are those compatible with these
values. Thus, the Ontario McGuinty Government’s ambitious Green
Energy and Green Economy Act of 2009300 was unveiled largely on the
premise that the forecast surge in investment in clean and renewable
energy would pay substantial economic dividends.301 Of course, there is
nothing inherently objectionable to seeking prosperity while protecting
the environment—that, after all, is the goal of sustainable development.
But it is risky to make protection of the environment hinge solely on

295. ENV’T CAN., NATIONAL ACTION PROGRAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE, passim (1995).
296. See Nic Rivers & Mark Jaccard, Canada's Efforts Towards Greenhouse Gas Emission
Reduction: A Case Study on the Limits of Voluntary Action and Subsidies, 23 INT’L J. GLOBAL
ENERGY ISSUES 307 (2005); MATTHEW BRAMLEY, THE CASE FOR KYOTO: THE FAILURE OF
VOLUNTARY CORPORATE ACTION 1 (2002).
297. See Kathryn Harrison, Talking With the Donkey: Cooperative Approaches to
Environmental Protection, 2 J. INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY 51 (1999); Deborah L. VanNijnatten, The
ARET Challenge, in VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES AND THE NEW POLITICS OF CORPORATE
GREENING 91 (Robert B. Gibson ed., 1999).
298. See O’Connor, supra note 287, at 390 (discussing, for example, the problems of reliance
on voluntary guidelines for reporting adverse drinking water test results).
299. See David M. Kotz, The Financial and Economic Crisis of 2008: A Systemic Crisis of
Neoliberal Capitalism, 41 REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 305 (2008).
300. S.O. 2009, c. 12.
301. See Ontario's Green Energy Act: Our Path to a Green Economy and a Cleaner
Environment, MINISTRY OF ENERGY AND INFRASTRUCTURE, http://www.mei.gov.on.ca/
en/energy/gea (last visited Sept. 20, 2010).
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perceived economic benefits when many environmental values cannot be
priced in a market economy.302
C.

The Primacy of Primary Industries

A further reason for the stagnation of Canadian environmental law
is the distinctive structure of its economy. Primary industries, including
agriculture, forestry, mining, oil, and gas, have long been a bulwark of
Canada’s economy and continue to be “very effective at shaping the
public policy agenda” around themselves.303 Despite the rhetoric from
business and political elites about turning Canada into a “knowledgebased economy” anchored on financial services, higher education,
science, and technology development,304 the Canadian economy still relies
heavily on these “old” industries.
These industries are more influential than their contribution to GDP
would suggest. In 2007, shortly before the recent economic downturn,
Canada’s mining, oil, and gas sector contributed only 4.8 percent of
national GDP; and agriculture, forestry, fisheries and hunting 2.2 percent,
compared to 20 percent from the financial sector.305 The disproportionate
influence of extractive industries comes instead from its high
concentration in western Canada. Oil, gas, mining, and related resourcesbased industries contributed 24.6 percent of Alberta’s GDP in 2003,
nearly identical to its relative value in 1971.306 However, in British
Columbia, the forestry industry’s share of provincial GDP declined from
11 percent to 6 percent between 1990 and 2008, a trend which ultimately
may diminish this industry’s political influence in a province whose
economy has long been dominated by the natural resources sector.307
The primary sector is also very important to Canada’s international
trade. In 2008, agriculture comprised 8.3 percent of the value of Canada’s
exports, while energy contributed 25.6 percent, forestry 5.2 percent and

302. See Frank Dietz & Jan van der Straaten, Economic Theories and the Necessary
Integration of Ecological Insights, in THE POLITICS OF NATURE: EXPLORATIONS IN GREEN
POLITICAL THEORY 118, 123 (Andrew Dobson & Paul Lucardie eds., 1993).
303. Winfield, supra note 175, at 88.
304. For background, see Richard Harris, The Knowledge-based Economy: Intellectual
Origins and New Economic Perspectives, 3 INT’L J. MGMT. REVS. 21 (2001).
305. See STATISTICS CAN., CANADA YEAR BOOK 2008, at 109 (2008).
306. See PEMBINA INSTITUTE, ECONOMIC DIVERSITY IN ALBERTA: HOW MUCH? 2 (2004),
available at http://pubs.pembina.org/reports/02.Economic_Diversity.pdf (containing figures
covering “resource based industries,” which are defined to include petroleum, mining, forestry,
and agriculture).
307. See BCSTATS, BUSINESS INDICATORS: BRITISH COLUMBIA’S ECONOMY: THEN AND
NOW 3 (2008), available at http://www.bcstats.gov.bc.ca/pubs/bcbi/bcbi0812.pdf (last visited Apr.
6, 2010).
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mining 11.2 percent.308 The sector overall thus supplied at least half of
Canada’s export earnings. Their significance is even more pronounced in
some provinces: in 2008, 40.3 percent of Alberta’s exports were crude
petroleum, and an additional 25.6 percent were gas and gas liquids.309
Only for Ontario and Quebec do resource exports constitute less than 50
percent of total exports.310
Canada’s continuing dependence on primary industries limits the
political feasibility of environmental regulations, such as GHG emission
controls, that could reduce the international competitiveness of
businesses. While Canadian manufacturers are generally less carbon
intensive than the international average, as they rely on hydroelectric and
nuclear energy, Canadian extractive industries tend to be above the
international average in terms of carbon intensity.311 A study by the C.D.
Howe Institute found that a common carbon price across countries would
therefore likely have “significant negative effects” on extractive
industries in Canada.312 The result of this economic dependence is a
system encouraging “rapid, opportunistic extraction” while inhibiting
systemic, long term, and large-scale environmental management.313 In
some cases governments actually lag behind industry in implementing
innovative environmental reforms, while marginalizing environmental
non-governmental organizations in public policy making.314
On the other hand, Canada’s preoccupation with international
competitiveness may make it vulnerable to countervailing pressure to
improve environmental standards when its major trading partners raise
their environmental standards.315 Historically, Canadian regulators have
felt pressure to conform to U.S. standards in areas such as drug and food

308. See Exports of Goods on a Balance-of-Payments Basis, by Product, STATISTICS CAN.,
http://www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/gblec04-eng.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2010). Percentages are
calculated by authors.
309. See GOV’T OF ALTA., HIGHLIGHTS OF THE ALBERTA ECONOMY 2009, at 9 (2009). In
monetary terms, the amounts were C$47.8 billion and C$30.4 billion respectively, out of total
exports in 2008 worth approximately C$118 billion. Id.
310. See Adam Wellstead, The (Post) Staples Economy and the (Post) Staples State in
Historical Perspective, 1 CAN. POL. SCI. REV. 8, 14 (2007).
311. See Chris Bataille, Benjamin Dachis & Nic Rivers, Pricing Greenhouse Gas Emissions:
The Impact on Canada’s Competitiveness, 280 C.D. HOWE INST. COMMENTARY 1, 3 (2009).
312. Id. For further discussion about Canadian climate policy and its economic costs, see
Alastair Lucas, Mythology, Fantasy and Federalism: Canadian Climate Change Policy and Law,
20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 41 (2007).
313. See Debra Davidson & Norah MacKendrick, State-Capital Relations in Voluntary
Environmental Improvement, 55 CURRENT SOCIOLOGY 674, 683 (2007).
314. See id. at 684.
315. See generally Steven Bernstein & Benjamin Cashore, The Influence of Globalization
and Internationalization on Domestic Policy Change, in POWER IN THE GLOBAL ERA:
GROUNDING GLOBALIZATION 110 (Theodore H. Cohn, Stephen McBride & John Wiseman
eds., 2000).
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safety given the considerable trade between these jurisdictions.316 While
the North American Free Trade Agreement’s environmental provisions
exert little direct pressure on Canadian regulators,317 direct pressure from
the United States can matter. For example, President Obama has spoken
out against using energy from “dirty” sources,318 California has signed an
agreement limiting oil imports from carbon-intensive sources,319 and onethousand U.S. city mayors have agreed not to import oil from Alberta’s
tar sands.320 Canada recently announced that it would bring its new
vehicle fuel efficiency standards in line with U.S. federal standards.321
International pressure therefore can have positive impacts on Canada’s
environmental standards.
While Canada is not the only Western nation to rely economically on
its primary sector to such an extent—perhaps Australia is the only other
state to have suffered environmentally as much as Canada has from such
economic dependence322—this economic dependence has been a
significant cause of Canada’s weak environmental record.
D.

Electoral Politics and Public Opinion

The Canadian governments’ prevarication or intransigence on the
environment also reflects both the cyclical nature of public concern for
the environment and the tendency for electoral politics to blunt
environmentalist voices. Federal and provincial willingness to be
proactive on environmental issues varies with the level of public concern
about the environment.323 However, public opinion is not always an
accurate bellwether for the direction of Canadian environmental law
because the electoral system makes it difficult to translate public concern
into a reliable political force for action.

316. See George Hoberg, Governing the Environment: Comparing Canada and the United
States, in DEGREES OF FREEDOM: CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES IN A CHANGING WORLD
341, 381 (Keith G. Banting, George Hoberg & Richard Simeon eds., 1997).
317. See PIERRE-MARC JOHNSON AND ANDRÉ BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND
NAFTA: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW 111–12 (1996).
318. Nicola Jones, Obama May Be Tough on Canada’s Tar Sands, NATURE NEWS (Feb. 13,
2009), http://www.nature.com/news/2009/090213/full/news.2009.103.html.
319. Terry Macalister, Oil Groups Mount Legal Challenge to Schwarzenegger's Tar Sands
Ban, GUARDIAN (Feb. 14, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/feb/14/oil-sands-banlegal-challenge.
320. See Anna Hopper, A Crude Reality: Canada’s Oil Sands and Pollution, 30 HARV. INT’L
REV. 9, 9 (2008).
321. See Canada, U.S. Tighten Rules on Vehicle Emissions: Aim to Cut Greenhouse Gases
25% in Six Years, TORONTO STAR, April 2, 2010, at A8.
322. See DAVID C. MERCER, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: NATURAL RESOURCE CONFLICT
IN AUSTRALIA 58–60, 206–69, 270–312 (3d ed. 2000).
323. See Harrison, supra note 136, at 133–34.
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According to public opinion polls, Canadians are among the
staunchest environmentalists in the world.324 A 2007 poll suggested that
public interest in the environment was as high as in the halcyon days of
the early 1970s.325 The level of support over the past forty years appears
to be stronger than in comparable jurisdictions.326 Professor Paehlke
attributes these apparently strong environmental values among
Canadians to the country’s relatively vast areas of wilderness and the fact
that the environment has been a seminal influence in Canada’s art,
literature, and other cultural domains.327 In terms of what Canadians
think of their own governments’ performance, a 2007 survey from
Environics showed that they were generally critical of Ottawa’s record on
environmental issues, with 39 percent saying the government was doing a
poor job and 41 percent believing it had done “only [a] fair job.”328
While these high levels of public concern imply “strong expectations
of government action,”329 they have not necessarily translated into strong
environmental protection law. Of course, feeling concerned about the
environment is not the same as being well informed. Professor Kathryn
Harrison observes, for instance, that despite the importance of Canada’s
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, only about half of the Canadians
surveyed in 2003 were aware of this decision.330
Still, there is a general sense that Canadians still care deeply for the
environment. The growth of the Greens in Canada, particularly since
2000 at the federal level and in Ontario and British Columbia, perhaps
indicates a structural shift in public opinion with the presence of a
political party dedicated to keeping the spotlight on environmental issues.
However, the Greens have yet to elect a single member to a provincial
legislature or federal Parliament.331 This gap between public concern and
political action is partly a result of both the structure of party politics and
the electoral system that governs parliamentary representation. As in
324. See BOYD, supra note 3, at 4.
325. See Campbell Clark, Saving the Environment Overtakes Stamping Out Corruption,
GLOBE & MAIL, July 19, 2007, at A13.
326. Canadians tend to be voice greater environmental concern than Americans, according
to surveys. See, e.g., Canadians and Americans Call for More Action on the Environment, Angus
Reid Public Opinion (July 19, 2010), http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/43139/canadians-andamericans-call-for-more-action-on-the-environment2.
327. See Paehlke, supra note 155, at 161.
328. Canadians are Critical of the Country's Environmental Performance, ENVIRONICS (Apr.
11, 2007, 4:40 PM), http://erg.environics.net/media_room/default.asp?aID=632.
329. Winfield, supra note 175, at 79.
330. See Kathryn Harrison, The Road not Taken: Climate Change Policy in Canada and the
United States, 7 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 92, 94 (2007).
331. In 2008, a sitting Member of Parliament, Blair Wilson, joined the federal Green Party
but was defeated in the 2008 federal election. See Green Party to Announce its First Member of
Parliament, CBC NEWS (Aug. 30, 2008, 7:57 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/
08/30/green-party.html. For a summary of the 2008 election results, see http://www.sfu.ca/
~aheard/elections/results.html.
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many other Western liberal-democratic systems, electoral contests in
Canada at all levels have become effectively reduced to a sparse choice
between two or three established political parties, each of which seeks to
become a “catch-all party” appealing to the widest number of voters
through broadly cast and vaguely defined platforms built on a predictable
menu of policies relating primarily to economic managerial
competency.332 The 2008 Canadian federal election was seemingly
unusual in the decision by one of the major parties, the Liberals, to
campaign for a “Green Shift” which would have included a carbon tax
and other ecological fiscal reforms.333 Yet Liberal leader Stéphane Dion
did such a poor job convincing the public and his own party of this
platform that both he and the platform were dropped unceremoniously
after Harper’s Conservatives won reelection.334
The bias that this political system creates against accommodating
interest groups advocating specific issues including environmental
matters is reinforced by Canada’s FPTP electoral system, which leads
frequently to situations where the composition of the legislature does not
reflect the popular vote.335 Proportional representation systems, which
more directly reflect the total vote composition across ridings, tend to be
more responsive to environmental concerns.336 This is because “winnertake-all” systems such as Canada’s FPTP respond most to median voters
and less to small parties, like the Greens, whose support tends to be
dispersed. In the 2008 Canadian election, the Green Party received 6.8
percent of the popular vote but won no seats, while the Bloc Québecois
(whose voter base is restricted to Québec) won 50 seats (out of 308) with
10 percent of the popular vote.337 The FPTP system also prevails in the
provinces. Recent popular referenda in British Columbia and Ontario to
switch to proportional representation were defeated handily, partly due
to lacklustre support from the very governments that sponsored them.338

332. On this phenomenon generally, see CLAUS OFFE, CONTRADICTIONS OF THE WELFARE
STATE 185–86 (1984).
333. See Chris Boutet, Key Election Issues: Environment and the “Green Shift”, NATIONAL
POST (Sept. 7, 2008, 8:30 AM), http://network.nationalpost.com/NP/blogs/posted/
archive/2008/09/07/key-election-issues-environment-and-the-green-shift.aspx.
334. See Whittington, supra note 192.
335. See Louis Massicotte, Canada: Sticking to First-Past-the-Post, for the Time Being, in
THE POLITICS OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 99, 103 (Michael Gallagher & Paul Mitchell eds., 2005).
336. See Kathryn Harrison & Lisa M. Sundstrom, The Comparative Politics of Climate
Change, 7 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 1, 9 (2007).
337. See 40th General Election (2008), ELECTIONS CANADA (Apr. 1, 2010),
http://enr.elections.ca/National_e.aspx.
338. See Stephanie Levitz, B.C. Voters Reject New Electoral System in Second Referendum,
CANADIAN PRESS (May 13, 2009); Colin Perkel, Electoral Reform Down But Not Out After Ont.
Referendum Failure: Experts, CANADIAN PRESS (Oct. 11, 2007); Colin Perkel, Critics Assail
Elections Ontario, McGuinty for Lack of Referendum Awareness, CANADIAN PRESS (Oct. 3,
2007).
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Consider, by contrast, the fortunes of the Green Party in New
Zealand, which has had a proportional representation system since 1993.
The Greens won 6.72 percent of the national vote in the 2008
parliamentary election, translating into 9 seats in the 122 seat
parliament.339 With a similar electoral system in Germany, the Green
Party won 10.27 percent of the popular vote in the 2009 election,
acquiring 68 seats in the 662 seat Bundestag.340 It is no coincidence that
some of the most progressive environmental law reforms in recent
decades have come from these two jurisdictions.341
Another ballot structure, used in many Australian legislative
assemblies, is preferential voting, in which voters rank a list of candidates
in order of preference.342 If no candidate wins an absolute majority, the
candidate with the fewest votes is excluded and his or her votes are
transferred to the other candidates according to the second preferences
indicated by voters on the ballot papers. This process continues until one
candidate has a majority of total votes cast. While this system has not led
to the kind of parliamentary representation for the Green Party in
Australia found in New Zealand or Germany (except in the Australian
Senate, which uses proportional representation),343 preferential voting has
allowed the Greens to influence the policies of the major parties by
directing how its members should rank competing candidates when
voting.344
We can thus conclude that while environmental law around the
world has been hindered by the obstacles discussed in Part I of this
Article, it faces additional constraints in Canada because of its electoral
system.

339. See General Election 2008 – Official Results, ELECTIONS NEW ZEALAND (Apr. 1, 2010),
http://www.elections.org.nz/news/2008-election-official-results.html.
340. See Final Result of the Election to the German Bundestag 2009, FED’L RETURNING
OFFICER (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/bundestagswahlen/BTW_BUND_
09/ ergebnisse/ bundesergebnisse/index.html.
341. These include Germany’s Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz EEG [Act Revising the
Legislation on Renewable Energy Sources in the Electricity Sector and Amending Related
Provisions], 2008, available at http://www.erneuerbare-energien.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/
application/pdf/eeg_2009_en.pdf , and New Zealand’s Climate Change Response Act, 2002, no.
40, available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2002/0040/latest/DLM158584.html.
342. See Electoral Systems–Preferential Voting Systems, ELECTORAL COUNCIL OF AUSTL.
(July 25, 2010), http://www.eca.gov.au/systems/single/by_category/preferential.htm.
343. Unusually, however, in the 2010 federal election the Greens gained a pivotal seat in the
House of Representatives, in Australia’s first “hung” parliament since 1940. See Alison Rourke,
Australian PM Julia Gillard Signs Pact with Greens, GUARDIAN (September 1, 2010),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/01/julia-gillard-australia-greens-deal.
344. See Campbell Sharman, Anthony M. Sayers & Narelle Miragliotta, Trading Party
Preferences: The Australian Experience of Preferential Voting, 21 ELECTORAL STUDIES 543, 549
(2002).
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V. HINTS OF A RENAISSANCE?
Despite Canada’s patchy record over the past two decades, some
bright spots have emerged in recent years that may hint at a renaissance.
Because of Canada’s federal constitutional structure, and economic and
geographical diversity, some significant disparities can arise in the nature
of environmental law across the country.345 It is unclear yet whether some
of the recent innovations, to be discussed in this section, herald a turning
point in environmental law in Canada. Several factors have coalesced to
strengthen the prospects for reform, including growing international
pressure and popular demand for action on global warming and
biodiversity,346 and increasing recognition of the indispensability of
healthy ecosystems to economic prosperity.347 All of these innovations
have, however, encountered stiff resistance or lacklustre implementation,
making it difficult to discern an overall trend.
A.

Institutionalizing Sustainability

The lexicon of environmental law reform in Canada is increasingly
dominated by references to “sustainability” or “sustainable
development.” As noted earlier, ostensibly it has become the guiding
norm of environmental law making worldwide, most prominently in New
Zealand’s Resource Management Act of 1991348 and the Swedish
Environmental Code of 1999.349 While no government in Canada has
gone as far as these examples in terms of legislating overarching and
enforceable statutory goals of sustainable development for governmental
decision makers, efforts to institutionalize sustainability have occurred
since the late 1980s and have regained momentum recently.
Although it has garnered little media attention to date, Canada’s
new Federal Sustainable Development Act of 2008,350 sponsored by the
Opposition, is potentially significant. Introduced partly to correct some of
the flaws in the 1995 reforms that established the Commissioner of the
Environment and Sustainable Development and required departments to
prepare sustainable development plans,351 the 2008 Act requires the
federal government to create and implement a government-wide
345. See Neil Hawke, Canadian Federalism and Environmental Protection, 14 J. ENVTL. L.
185, 193–95 (2002).
346. See MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, supra note 11, at 13–15.
347. See, e.g., STERN, supra note 60, at 122–42.
348. Resource Management Act, 1991, No. 69, available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/
act/public/1991/0069/latest/DLM230265.html.
349. Swedish Environmental Code, 1999, available at http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/
2023/a/22847.
350. S.C. 2008, c. 33.
351. See ENV’T CAN., SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES: EVOLUTION OF THE
FEDERAL APPROACH (2001).
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sustainability strategy, including scientifically-measurable sustainability
targets, and to regularly evaluate and report on the environmental
consequences of its actions.352 This law was, however, forced on an
unwilling Prime Minister Harper who has demonstrated unusual hostility
toward both environmental protection and government accountability. Its
prospects for serious implementation on his watch are dim.
This legislation builds on several similar provincial laws. One of the
first was Manitoba’s Sustainable Development Act of 1997,353 which has
as its stated purpose: “To create a framework through which sustainable
development will be implemented in the provincial public sector and
promoted in private industry and in society generally.”354 The Act’s
“Principles and Guidelines of Sustainable Development” provide an
unusually high level of specificity regarding what “sustainable
development” means,355 and its implementation is supported by an
advisory Round Table on the Environment and the Economy.
On paper, sustainability is now an obligatory feature of almost all
environmental laws and policies in Canada. Nova Scotia’s Environmental
Goals and Sustainable Prosperity Act of 2007, for example, enumerates
twenty-one long-term environmental purposes of the province, ranging
from reduced air emissions to greater reliance on renewable energy, and
states that the long-term environmental and economic objective of Nova
Scotia is to “fully integrate environmental sustainability and economic
prosperity.”356 The language of sustainability has also permeated a range
of sectoral legislation, such as Ontario’s Crown Forest Sustainability Act
of 1994.357 It also appears in strategic policies and plans, including
Québec’s Government Sustainable Development Strategy 2008–2013,358 to
give effect to the province’s ambitious Sustainable Development Act of
2006359 and British Columbia’s Water Sustainability Action Plan of 2004.360
Manitoba’s Sustainable Development Act of 1998 makes provision for a
sustainable development code of practice, green financial management
guidelines, and green procurement guidelines throughout the provincial

352. See S.C. 2008, c. 33, s. 9.
353. S.M. 1997, c. 61; see also John Krowina, Manitoba’s Sustainable Development Act, 25
MANITOBA L.J. 385 (1998).
354. S.M. 1997, c. 61, s. 2.
355. See S.M. 1997, c. 61, sched. A–B.
356. S.N.S. 2007, c. 7, s. 4(2); see John Brazner, Legislating Sustainability: Nova Scotia's New
Law Marries Environmental Sustainability and Economic Prosperity, 34 ALTERNATIVES J. 16
(2008).
357. S.O. 1994, c. 25.
358. GOV’T OF QUE., GOVERNMENT SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 2008–2013
(2007).
359. R.S.Q. 2006, c. D-8.
360. B.C. WATER AND WASTE ASSOC., WATER SUSTAINABILITY ACTION PLAN (2004).
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government.361 Again, all of these laws face serious obstacles to
implementation.
One area in which we see genuine innovation is in the field of
environmental impact assessment. Several federal environmental
assessment review panels have adopted a “sustainability assessment”
framework.362 Instead of a narrow focus on mitigating “significant adverse
environmental effects,” this framework asks whether a proposed project
will make a net positive contribution to sustainability. While it has only
been used in a handful of cases, the rate of rejection of projects under this
framework (two of five) is vastly higher than under the conventional
approach (likely less than 1 percent), suggesting that it may represent a
genuinely new, ecologically and culturally protective paradigm of impact
assessment. There are already indications, however, that this will lead
proponents and governments to squash this innovation in its infancy.363
B.

With or Without You: Provincial Initiatives on Climate Change

In the face of federal government inaction on climate change, other
actors have taken the initiative. One significant example of federal
inaction was Canada’s failure to take action to fulfill its obligations under
the Kyoto Protocol. This came despite federal Opposition parties taking
advantage of Prime Minister Harper’s minority position in Parliament to
pass the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act in 2007 requiring Ottawa to
publish a plan specifying how Canada would meet its GHG emission
reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.364 The law also required
the government to enact regulations by a specific date to give effect to its
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.365 This legislation appears to be
unique in the world.
Sadly, the plan the government published in response to the law
simply rehashed its pre-existing policies, which were designed explicitly
not to comply with Kyoto.366 The National Round Table on the
Environment and Economy confirmed that the plan was incapable of

361. S.M. 1998, c. S270, s. 12(2),
362. These include the Voisey’s Bay (1997), Red Hill (1999), Kemess North (2007), White’s
Point (2007) and MacKenzie Gas (2010) review panels. See Robert B. Gibson, Favouring the
Higher Test: Contribution to Sustainability as the Central Criterion for Reviews and Decisions
under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 10 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 39 (2000); Alberto
Fonseca & Robert Gibson, Application Denied, 34 ALTERNATIVES J. 10 (2008); JOINT REVIEW
PANEL FOR THE MACKENZIE GAS PROJECT, FOUNDATION FOR A SUSTAINABLE NORTHERN
FUTURE (2010).
363. See Fonseca & Gibson, supra note 362, at 12.
364. S.C. 2007, c. 30.
365. Id. s. 7(1).
366. GOV’T OF CAN., A CLIMATE CHANGE PLAN FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE KYOTO
PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION ACT (2008), available at http://www.ec.gc.ca/doc/ed-es/p_124/CCPlan-2008_eng.pdf
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fulfilling Canada’s Kyoto commitments.367 The government published no
regulations, draft or final, by the prescribed deadlines. The federal courts
rejected an application for judicial review of this defiance of Parliament
on the ground that it raised non-justiciable political questions.368 Leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was refused in March 2010,369
shutting the door on this effort to hold the government judicially
accountable for its violation of apparently non-discretionary statutory
mandates while confirming the Canadian courts’ extreme deference to
the executive on controversial environmental issues. This stands in stark
contrast to American appellate courts, which found complicated climate
change disputes to be justiciable around the same time.370
Real action on GHG emissions reductions and promotion of green
energy has therefore been left to the provinces.371 Québec introduced
North America’s first (modest) carbon tax in 2007,372 followed by a more
substantial tax in British Columbia in 2008. British Columbia’s tax was
part of an ambitious package of climate change-related policies including
tougher-than-Kyoto GHG reduction targets, a cap-and-trade system, a
carbon-neutral electricity generation system, one hundred percent carbon
capture and storage for coal-fired power plants, and adoption of
California’s low carbon fuel and GHG tailpipe emission standards.373
Ontario and Quebec have also enacted cap-and-trade legislation.374 Some
smaller provinces have also enacted measures; Manitoba, for example,
enacted the Climate Change and Emissions Reductions Act,375 which
aims to reduce GHG emissions to 6 percent below 1990 levels by 2012—a
target consistent with Canada’s Kyoto obligations376 and exceeding what

367. RESPONSE OF THE NATIONAL ROUND TABLE ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE
ECONOMY TO ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION ACT § 7.0
(2009), available at http://www.nrtee-trnee.com/eng/publications/KPIA-2009/Transmittal-LetterKPIA-NRTEE-Response-2009-eng.php.
368. See Friends of the Earth v. Canada (Minister of the Environment) (2008), [2009] 3
F.C.R. 201 aff’d, [2009] F.C.A. 297 (Can. C.A.).
369. Sup. Ct. Canada, No. 33469 (Mar. 25, 2010).
370. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009); Comer v.
Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009).
371. See DAVID SUZUKI FOUNDATION, supra note 239, at 1–3.
372. Quebec to Collect Nation’s First Carbon Tax, CBC NEWS (June 7, 2007),
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/montreal/story/2007/06/07/carbon-tax.html.
373. See, e.g., Greenhouse Gas Reduction Targets Act, S.B.C. 2007, c. 42; Greenhouse Gas
Reduction (Cap and Trade) Act, S.B.C. 2008, c. 32.
374. See, e.g., Environmental Protection Amendment Act (Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Trading) of 2009, S.O. 2009, c. 27; Act to Amend Environmental Quality Act and Other
Legislative Provisions in Relation to Climate Change, S.Q. 2009, c. 33.
375. S.M. 2008, c. 17, s. 3(1).
376. Canada is required to reduce her average annual greenhouse gas emissions during the
period 2008–12 to 6 percent below their level in 1990. See Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK ON CLIMATE CHANGE SECRETARIAT, available at https://unfccc.int/kyoto
_protocol/items/3145.php.
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the Harper Government has endorsed.377 Recently, Ontario took the
national lead in renewable energy promotion with its Green Energy and
Green Economy Act of 2009,378 which streamlines approvals and
introduces a wide range of economic incentives for green energy,
including German-inspired feed-in tariffs. Following a trend evident in
other areas of Canadian environmental policy,379 several provinces have
joined U.S. states in the Western Climate Initiative and Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, or have signed memoranda of understanding
on climate change with each other or with individual states.380 While these
provinces are setting the pace nationally, most of their initiatives are
modelled after reforms pioneered elsewhere.
Not all provincial initiatives should be regarded as progressive. For
example, Alberta’s Climate Change and Emissions Management Act,381
which aims to reduce emissions relative to provincial GDP through
“energy intensity” targets for controlled sectors, is predicted to allow
emissions to rise 33 percent above 1990 levels by 2020.382
C.

Municipal Environmental Governance

Some of the most practical reforms are occurring in municipal
governance. Historically a backwater for environmental policy,383 many
municipalities across Canada are adopting vibrant plans, bylaws, and
other measures to protect urban vegetation, improve waste management,
curb suburban sprawl, and take other initiatives commonly associated

377. Backgrounder: Harper Government’s January 2010 Greenhouse Gas Target,
GREENPEACE (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.greenpeace.org/canada/en/recent/ottawa_wrong
_climate_change/backgrounder_harper_2010_gas_target.
378. S.O. 2009, c. 12.
379. For example, the Great Lakes Charter of 1985 and the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River
Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement of 2005, signed by the governors of the eight
states bordering the Great Lakes and the premiers of Ontario and Québec. See COUNCIL OF
GREAT LAKES GOVERNORS, http://www.cglg.org (last visited Jan. 30, 2010). For the text of the
Great Lakes Charter, see http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/GreatLakesCharter.pdf. For
the text of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement,
see
http://www.mnr.gov.on.ca/stdprodconsume/groups/lr/@mnr/@water/documents/document/
200040.pdf.
380. See, e.g., Provincial and State Partner Contacts, W. CLIMATE INITIATIVE
http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/wci-partners (last visited Oct. 2, 2010); Memorandum
between the Province of Ontario and the State of California for Collaboration on Climate
Change and Energy Efficiency (May 30, 2007), available at http://gov.ca.gov/pdf/
press/53007_Ontario_MOU.pdf.
381. S.A. 2003, c. C–16.7.
382. See DAVID SUZUKI FOUNDATION, ALL OVER THE MAP: A COMPARISON OF
PROVINCIAL CLIMATE CHANGE PLANS 12 (2005).
383. See generally JOHN SEWELL, THE SHAPE OF THE CITY: TORONTO STRUGGLES WITH
MODERN PLANNING (1993).
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with the “smart growth” movement.384 The Supreme Court’s landmark
decision in the Spraytech case of 2001,385 which affirmed broad municipal
jurisdiction to regulate environmental matters in their localities, greatly
emboldened local governments. For example, many municipalities,
including Toronto and Halifax, have passed bylaws banning or restricting
non-essential pesticide use.386 Many Canadian cities have also joined a
global coalition of municipalities committed to advancing local action on
climate change. The Vancouver City Council in 2005 adopted its own
climate change plan which contains “climate protection targets,” such as
requiring all new buildings to be carbon neutral by 2020.387 Toronto was
one of the first North American cities to develop a climate change
adaptation plan, in 2008.388
Other smart growth reforms have come from provincial legislation.
Ontario has been particularly ambitious, enacting in 2005 the Greenbelt
Act389 and Places to Grow Act.390 The former—enacted, ironically, around
the time that leading American greenbelt zones like those in Portland,
Oregon were being reduced391—provides permanent protection to much
of the agricultural lands and other countryside surrounding the sprawling
Greater Toronto area, while the latter enables a more coordinated
approach to concentrating urban growth and economic activity in a few
high-density regional hubs. Greenbelt reforms have been applied to some
other Canadian cities, such as Calgary and Ottawa, although not with the
same stringency.392
While Canadian cities and other municipalities are a long way from
being paragons of sustainability, the inertia of previous decades when

384. See Don Alexander & Ray Tomalty, Smart Growth and Sustainable Development:
Challenges, Solutions and Policy Directions, 7 LOCAL ENV’T 397 (2002); BOHDAN ONYSCHUK,
MICHAEL KOVECEVIC & PETER NIKOLAKATKOS, SMART GROWTH IN NORTH AMERICA: NEW
WAYS TO CREATE LIVABLE COMMUNITIES (2001).
385. See 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d'arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001]
S.C.R. 241.
386. See Pesticide Timeline, CBC NEWS (May 21, 2004), http://www.cbc.ca/news/
background/pesticides/timeline.html; see, e.g., TORONTO, CAN., BY-LAW NO. 456-2003, available
at http://www.toronto.ca/health/hphe/pdf/pesticide_law0456.pdf; HALIFAX, CAN., BY-LAW NO.
P-800, available at http://www.halifax.ca/legislation/bylaws/hrm/blp-800.pdf.
387. See CITY OF VANCOUVER, VANCOUVER’S CLIMATE LEADERSHIP 4 (2009).
388. See CITY OF TORONTO, AHEAD OF THE STORM: PREPARING TORONTO FOR CLIMATE
CHANGE (2008).
389. S.O. 2005, c. 1.
390. S.O. 2005, c. 13.
391. CANADIAN INST. FOR ENVTL. LAW & POL’Y, ONTARIO’S GREENBELT IN AN
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 18 (2008), available at http://www.cielap.org/pdf/Greenbelt
InternationalContext.pdf (discussing recent enlargement of Portland’s urban development
boundary at the expense of the greenbelt).
392. See James Taylor, Cecelia Paine & John FitzGibbon, From Greenbelt to Greenways:
Four Canadian Case Studies, 33 LANDSCAPE & URBAN PLAN. 47 (1995).
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local governments subsidized suburban sprawl and prioritized the private
car is being actively questioned.
D.

Indigenous Rights and the Environment

Perhaps the best aspect of Canada’s environmental performance still
relates to Indigenous peoples. Since the constitutional recognition and
protection for Aboriginal rights in the Constitution Act of 1982,393 many
environmental management decisions have had to take into account the
legal interests of Indigenous stakeholders.394 The federal and provincial
governments no longer can extinguish Aboriginal title to land or
customary rights to hunt and fish, and any infringement of those rights
must meet due process requirements including a duty to consult with
affected First Nations. For example, in the Wood Buffalo litigation the
Supreme Court halted construction of a winter road through the park
because the Crown had failed to consult with the Mikisew Cree, whose
treaty rights had not been respected.395
Pursuant to the Comprehensive Land Claims Policy396 adopted in the
1970s, approximately twenty agreements have been negotiated between
Canadian governments and First Nations and Inuit peoples to deal with
outstanding Aboriginal rights. Many of these agreements, such as the
Inuvialuit and Nunavut Agreements, contain substantial provisions for
natural resource management, environmental protection, and
participation of local communities in decision-making processes.397
Further, since 1999, groups governed by the colonial-era Indian Act398
have had the opportunity to opt out of its archaic land management
provisions399 by negotiating agreements with the federal Ministry of
Indian Affairs.400 The First Nations Land Management Act of 1999401
393. See Section 35(1), the Act being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
394. See Graham White, Aboriginal People and Environmental Regulation, in CANADIAN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND POLITICS: PROSPECTS FOR LEADERSHIP AND INNOVATION,
supra note 3, at 87; Annie Booth & Norman Skelton, First Nations Access and Rights to
Resources, in RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN CANADA: ADDRESSING
CONFLICT AND UNCERTAINTY 80 (Bruce Mitchell ed., 2004).
395. See Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005]
S.C.R. 388.
396. Comprehensive Claims Policy, INDIAN & N. AFFAIRS CAN., http://www.aincinac.gc.ca/ai/scr/nt/edu/bzz/nls/ccp/index-eng.asp.
397. See Jennifer Dalton, Aboriginal Title and Self-Government in Canada: What is the True
Scope of Comprehensive Land Claims Agreements?, 22 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOCIAL
ISSUES 29 (2006).
398. An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Laws Respecting Indians. S.C. 1876, c. 18.
399. Id. ss. 18(1), 57, 58, 74(1) (lacking modern land use planning standards, and giving the
responsible Canadian government Minister significant discretionary authority over land use
management in Indian reserves).
400. FIRST NATIONS LAND ADVISORY BD., FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON FIRST NATIONS
LAND MANAGEMENT: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (2003), available at http://www.fafnlm.com/
documents/FAQ%20English.pdf.

2RICHARDSON-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1038

3/3/2011 10:14 AM

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 37:981

allows such groups to negotiate a new land code that is more sympathetic
to community needs. These and other initiatives have undoubtedly
enhanced the Indigenous voice in environmental decisions. And because
such peoples often seek to protect rather than unsustainably exploit their
traditional lands,402 these reforms have strengthened the scope for
environmental protection in areas subject to Indigenous rights and
interests.
Yet, it would be naïve to conclude sanguinely on this aspect of
Canada’s record. Like many of the other examples of a potential
resurgence in Canadian environmental law, flaws persist. Indigenous
groups remain frustrated by the lack of respect for their rights in many
cases.403 Litigation continues against some governments’ prevarication on
settling land claims, particularly in British Columbia,404 and opposition to
some mining and forestry companies persist, such as in Ontario’s Grassy
Narrows community.405 The shallowness of the political commitment of
the current federal government to address outstanding grievances is
perhaps clearest from its initial rejection of the UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 2007,406 and very belated signing on
November 12, 2010. Even Australia, with a poorer record in this area, has
endorsed the Declaration.407
CONCLUSION
This Article has illuminated the political, economic, and legal factors
that have shaped the rise and fall of Canadian environmental law. While
virtually all countries are experiencing sharp environmental decline and
are struggling to design or implement effective legislative and policy
responses, Canada’s record is among the worst. Its performance is all the
more disappointing given that at one time it was widely admired for its
progressiveness in dealing with environmental issues. The depth of
401. See First Nations Land Management Act, S.C. 1999, c. 24.
402. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 168, at 340–43, 349 (noting, however, that some
Indigenous peoples have been implicated in environmentally unsustainable practices, at 344–48).
403. See generally ABORIGINAL AND TREATY RIGHTS IN CANADA: ESSAYS ON LAW,
EQUALITY AND RESPECT FOR DIFFERENCE (Michael Asch ed., 1997).
404. See, e.g., Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2007] B.C.S.C. 1700 (Can. B.C.)
(where the Tsilhqot'in people sought declarations of their aboriginal land title to the contested
area, and declarations of aboriginal rights to hunt and trap and to trade in animal pelts).
405. See FREE GRASSY NARROWS (Feb. 13, 2010), http://www.freegrassy.org.
406. See General Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN
DEP’T OF PUB. INFO. (Sept. 13, 2007), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm;
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295
(Sept. 13, 2007). The Canadian Government signed the Declaration with certain qualifications
and on the understanding that it is legally not binding: John Ibbitson, Ottawa Endorses UN
Native-Rights Declaration, GLOBE & MAIL, Nov. 13, 2010, at A13.
407. See Experts Hail Australia’s Backing of UN Declaration of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights,
UN NEWS CENTRE (April 3, 2009), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=30382.
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decline in Canada would be more obvious were it not for the country’s
relatively small population and abundant natural resources. But its per
capita “eco-footprint” is a high seven hectares per person, placing it
seventh among all nations.408 This is both unsustainable and inequitable.
Although an extensive literature has mapped the weaknesses of
environmental law generally, to understand fully Canada’s circumstances
requires additional analysis of the interplay of specific domestic political,
economic, and legal issues. Federal-provincial relations, the political
influence of neo-liberalism, the economic primacy of extractive
industries, and an electoral system that can be unresponsive to public
environmental concerns are all salient factors that have hindered
environmental law reform in Canada. While some of these factors are
present in comparable jurisdictions, all are applicable to Canada. It is this
combination of circumstances that ultimately explains why Canada is a
laggard. Some recent innovations, such as in the areas of Indigenous
rights, municipal governance, and institutionalization of sustainability,
give hope that some of the factors that have hindered reform may be
losing sway. But it is premature to rejoice.
Ultimately, what is most frustrating about Canada’s poor
environmental record is not that it has failed to be an innovator, but that
it has failed even to borrow sufficiently the many successful precedents in
other countries. Improved legal tools to tackle problems such as climate
change and loss of biodiversity are emerging. If Canada lacks the
ingenuity to devise its own solutions, at the very least it should import
solutions pioneered elsewhere. It has failed to do so. The real problem
therefore is not the lack of legal tools but a domestic failure of policy
imagination.409
The Article has identified some significant road-blocks to reform.
International and domestic pressure for reform is bound to continue,
given that widespread environmental degradation in Canada persists.410
But even if Canada is able to remove some of the present hindrances,
such as by adopting proportional representation and reducing its
dependence on environmentally-burdensome extractive industries, it
would probably only slow rather than halt environmental decline. More
progressive environmental laws might ensue, building on the recent
emerging “renaissance,” but the underlying negative trends would
probably persist. Sustainability in Canada, as elsewhere, will likely only
arise if people are prepared to choose fundamentally different goals for
their society, including a fundamentally different economic model in

408. See WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, LIVING PLANET REPORT 2008, at 14 (2009).
409. Winfield, supra note 175.
410. For a recent overview, see THOMAS GUNTON & K.S. CALBICK, THE MAPLE LEAF IN
THE OECD: CANADA’S ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE

23 (2010).
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which maintenance of ecological integrity is a precondition to all
development.411 Environmental law is a means to an end, not an end in
itself.

411. Many scientists and economists have advocated more fundamental changes to
economic systems and institutions as the best way to achieve sustainability. See, e.g., DALY,
supra note 65; ROBERT COSTANZA, INSTITUTIONS, ECOSYSTEMS AND SUSTAINABILITY (2001).
We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our
online companion journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact ecologylawcurrents@boalt.org.
Responses to articles may be viewed at our website, http://www.boalt.org/elq.

